tained by asking the attendant if he saw such a flash and receiving his answer in the affirmative. This was technically termed servare de cælo "to observe something (i.e. lightning) coming from the sky." But this omen, so good in itself, might be used as an obstruction to other business. A thunderstorm occurring during a meeting of the People was unlucky and broke up the assembly; and accordingly the flash of lightning, which the magistrate was supposed to have seen, arrested all legislation for the day. To avoid this inconvenience the consul, when he fixed a day for the assembly of the People, used to issue an edict forbidding any inferior magistrate to look for lightning for any purpose of his own on that day. Such a prohibition was, however, of no avail against the consul's colleague or against the tribunes of the plebs, who were not bound to obey his orders. The duties and powers of the magistrates in this matter were accurately fixed for them by the Law of Ælius and Fufius (circ. 150 B.C.). By this law every magistrate holding an assembly of the People was forbidden to ignore any omen officially reported to him by his colleague, and every magistrate who had the right to "observe lightning" for his own purposes, might cause the same to be reported as a deterrent omen for his colleague who was proposing a bill to the People. Such a report rendered all proceedings by the assembly null and void. It is manifest that any sincere religious feeling on the subject, which may once have existed, must have died out before this cut-and-dried procedure was ordained. The regulation must be regarded not as a piece of super-
