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might be entrusted. At all events, the scheme to be presently described is intended, and I think adapted, to secure in an especial manner the strongest guarantees for the good behaviour of admitted officers; and it will be for the Conference to judge whether it does not offer more security in this respect than can at present be obtained.
It is not contended, however, that Competition would altogether prevent the entrance of unfit persons into the service. Some such persons must be expected to find admittance under any system. It is merit enough to claim for the plan of Competition that, while increasing the number and the efficiency of meritorious officers, it would both diminish the number and facilitate the removal of the incapable and ill-conducted. The remedy for the unavoidable admission of unsuitable persons is to be found in subsequent official discipline. Rewards and penalties—promotions, degradations, and dismissals—must be the means by which the body of officers in each department should be constantly preserved in a state of entire efficiency. There ought to be no excessive delicacy in such a matter; and, under a system of Competition, there need be none. Dismissal should follow, as of course, upon proof of unsuitableness, misconduct, or incapacity. The public has as much right as have private persons to decline to be ill-served, and no tenderness need be felt at getting rid of those who, knowing the conditions of the contract, voluntarily enter the service of the State.[1] The great evil of the present mode of treatment is that the good men are not adequately rewarded and the bad men are not sufficiently punished. I believe that the introduction of competition would render both courses more easy; though, singularly enough, it is one of the objections brought against that plan, that it would weaken the authority of the Heads of Departments, who, it is
- ↑ The late Mr. John Wood, Chairman of the Board of Inhand Revenue, says upon this point:—"The presiding power of the Department ought to have the free power of dismissal, and it would be a great advantage if too much regard were not paid to fixity of tenure, but that removal from office should be exercised with as little scruple in the service of the State as in that of individuals."—Papers relating to the Re-organization of the Civil Service.
