9
The argument in brief then is that by adopting the system of competition for civil appointments, combined with a strictness of discipline which under that system would be natural and easy of enforcement, a much better average of public servants, both mentally and morally, would be obtained than is possible under a continuance of the system of simple patronage; and this conclusion is but little affected by the fact that the nominees of patrons are now subjected to a test examination which excludes such as fall short of certain prescribed standards of minimum efficiency. As a check upon the excessive abuse of patronage, the examinations conducted by the Civil Service Commissioners are, undoubtedly, of considerable utility; as is shewn by the fact that, down to the end of 1856, they had rejected 144 Tidewaiters and Weighers out of 415 examined—220 Excise Expectants out of 555 examined—and 73 Letter Carriers out of 236 examined; being altogether 437 rejected out of 1206 examined, or 36 per cent. But it must be remembered that their power is limited to this prevention of abuses: they can turn back those who are absolutely too bad to be admitted; but they cannot secure the admission of those only who are the best amongst the competent. The effect of the present scheme is (1) that the utterly-incapable are all excluded, which is an evident advantage, and (2) that those who are admitted are not-utterly-incapable, which is also satisfactory, though not so satisfactory as would be the assurance that all were actually capable and the most capable that could be procured. Such an assurance, or the nearest possible approach to it, I believe we should obtain by a well regulated
mended would, by rendering more or less precarious the situations obtained lessen their value as prizes, and consequently the strength of the inducement to compete for them. It may be so; but the question is, whether, notwithstanding this drawback, the prizes would not be of ample value to attract worthy competitors; and I see no reason to doubt that plenty of good candidates would be found desirous of obtaining £60 or £70 a year, subject to a condition so much within their own power of fulfilment as that of continued good behaviour.
