And in addition to this error there was a misapplication of the European art of warfare. In Europe, where the masses of the troops are in column, and where the battle-field includes several towns or hamlets, the picked troops are kept in reserve until needed. In South America, a pitched battle generally takes place in an open field, the troops are not numerous, and the heat of the contest lasts but a short time, so that it is always desirable to rush in at once with the best men. In the present case, a cavalry charge was the worst possible beginning, but if it must needs be, it should at least have been made by the best troops, in order to rout at once the three hundred men who made up both army and reserve of the enemy. Instead of this, the old routine was followed: ordering to the front a large number of awkward militia, each man afraid of wounding himself with his own lance, and when the order to charge was given, they stood stock still, then fell back, and being charged upon by the enemy, gave way and embarrassed the best troops behind. In a moment all was confusion, and the battle lost; and Facundo passed on in triumph to Mendoza, without caring for the generals, infantry, and guns, which he left to his rear guard. This was the result: of the battle of Chacon, which left exposed the flank of the army of Cordova at the moment it was about to march upon Buenos Ayres. Quiroga's inconceivable audacity was crowned with the most complete success. It was useless to try to drive him from Mendoza; terror and the prestige of victory gave him means of resistance, while defeat had left his enemies discouraged. He would only have hastened to San Juan,
