confederacy, take away its rallying point, and destroy the power and influence of the Rání, whose name is prominently used to incite rebellion.'
Following up this letter. Sir Hugh Rose wrote himself to the Government of India on March 19th, 1858, expressing his wish to obey their instructions at a fitting time, as they completed a plan of operations which he and Sn Robert Hamilton had on the previous day agreed it would be advantageous to carry out 'after the reduction of Jhánsí.' He also wrote on the same day to General Whitlock informing him of his intention to attack Jhánsí at once and to co-operate with him afterwards. On the following day, March 20th, 1858, — Sir Hugh Rose himself being engaged from sunrise to sunset at the outposts in reconnoitring duty and in placing in position the siege batteries, — Sir Robert Hamilton again addressed the Government of India, recapitulating the reasons why the General considered it important to attack Jhánsí[1]. Sir Hugh
- ↑ It is expedient to give these facts at some length since Sir Robert Hamilton, in a memorandum written four years afterwards (March 20th, 1862) averred that Sir Hugh Rose hesitated to disobey the orders received, and that he (Sir E. Hamilton) took on himself the responsibility of 'proceeding with the operations against Jhánsí.' As this assertion has obtained for him the credit of having saved the campaign, it is right to state that it has no foundation, and was evidently made from memory. It is hardly likely, to say the least of it, that the military commander would have allowed the political officer to supersede his authority in so momentous a military decision; although it must be acknowledged that Sir Robert Hamilton did good service in agreeing with that decision, inasmuch as an opposite course would manifestly have increased the difficulties of the moment. Sir Hugh Rose never thought it
