Jackson, J., dissenting
Griggs.
IV
To justify its new mandatory-general-stay rule, the majority ultimately rests on its assessment of what is “sensible.” Ante, at 5–6. But even the majority’s policy concerns do not support its rule.
The dispute here turns on a subset of cases—those in which a stay is not warranted under the usual discretionary standard. See Nken, 556 U. S., at 434. All agree that an interlocutory appeal should trigger a stay if that standard is met. But the majority goes further and requires a stay in all cases. Indeed, the majority mandates a stay even if none of the traditional stay prerequisites are present: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, favorable balance of equities, and alignment with the public interest. See ibid.
The majority offers no good reason for that result. The majority says that an automatic stay protects the party seeking arbitration and conserves resources in case the dispute “ultimately head[s] to arbitration” after appeal. Ante, at 6. But the concern fades if that scenario is unrealistic—i.e., if the party seeking arbitration is unlikely to succeed on appeal.
The majority’s concern is even weaker when a stay would harm the opposing party and the public interest much more than it would protect the party seeking arbitration. Take, for example, a case in which crucial evidence would be lost if discovery is delayed. Say a witness is on her deathbed. Under the majority’s rule, if an interlocutory arbitrability appeal under §16(a) is pending, discovery must be stayed and the evidence must be lost. That is apparently so even if the parties agree they wish to proceed with discovery.
The majority’s rule also prevents courts from crafting case-specific solutions to balance all the interests at stake. Under the traditional discretionary-stay rule, for instance,
