Act was not open to constitutional objections. That statement, of course, was intended to apply to the facts of the appeal then being considered. In Gurein v. State, 209 Ark. 1082, 193 S. W. 2d 997, the provisions of the Act formerly dealt with were treated as constitutional upon authority of the Smith–Brown case. To the extent that judicial construction of a Legislative Act would deprive an accused person of equal protection of the law, Amendment Fourteen to the Federal Constitution would be violated; but that question is not involved in the dispute with which we are dealing. Our consideration in this respect is directed to the single proposition that force and violence were employed by two of the defendants.
A literal construction of that part of § 2 of Act 193 making it a felony for any person “acting either by himself, or as a Member of a group or organization, or acting in concert with one or more persons, to promote, encourage, or aid [in the character of unlawful assemblage there prohibited”] would, it is said, prevent peaceful picketing. The Act does not have this purpose in view, and if it did that part would be struck down by the Courts. Riggs v. Tucker Duck & Rubber Co., 196 Ark. 571, 119 S. W. 2d 507.
Information in the instant case, while charging that Cole, Bean, and Jones violated the quoted provision of § 2 of the Act, also accused them of using force and violence to prevent Williams from working. The use of force or violence, or threat of the use of force or violence, is made unlawful by § 1.
Third.—(b)—In view of the fact that the judgments as to Cole and Jones are affirmed without invoking any part of § 2 of the Act, it is not necessary to discuss the construction appellants think the facts do not sustain.
Fourth.—(a)—It is admitted that a labor dispute existed and that while the defendants were not “walking picket” they were striking against Southern Cotton Oil Company in Little Rock. Facts incident to the difficulty between Campbell and Williams are set out in the opinion of October 7, 1946. There is substantial testimony in the
