CHINA 476 CHINA in which it was indicated where the latter had been remiss in fulfilling its obliga- tions. It was claimed that the Boxer indemnities which had been remitted by the Allies in order to foster war indus- tries had been wasted in party squabbles; that enemy property had not been con- fiscated nor enemy enterprises thwarted as they should have been; in short, that in many respects China had been lukewarm and supine. This was denied, but not convincingly. The result was that when the Chinese delegates appeared at the Peace Conference to claim their share of the fruits of victory, the burden of proof lay with them to show that they were entitled to them. In the early stages of the proceedings at Paris, a contention arose between China and Japan on the subject of Shantung, second only in importance to the rival claims of Italy and Jugoslavia to Fiume. Shantung was of great value to the Chinese, not only from commercial but sentimental considerations. It was to China what Mecca was to the Moham- medans and Jerusalem to the Jews, their Holy Land, the birthplace of their civili- zation, hallowed by memories of their great sages, Mencius and Confucius. The Chinese claimed that it belonged to them by right of nationality, that it was Chinese to the core, that it had been torn from them by force and should be re- turned to them as a matter of right. Kiao-Chau, an important seaport in the province of Shantung, together with im- portant mining and railway concessions, had been extorted from China by Ger- many in 1897. In 1914, shortly after the beginning of the World War, Kiao-Chau was captured mainly by Japanese forces, though British naval forces co-operated in its capture. Germany had been ousted from that section of the world, and Japan remained in undisturbed possession until the close of the war. An agreement was made in 1915 between China and Japan, in which the former agreed in advance to any arrangement that might ultimately be made by Japan with Germany regard- ing the disposition of the territory. Japan it the same time promised that in re- turn for certain important concessions, she would eventually restore Kiao-Chau to China. Before the Peace Conference, Japan urged that what she had taken from Germany in actual fighting ought to remain hers by right of conquest, though she still adhered to her promise to restore the territory eventually to China. This was vague and unsatis- factory, for Japan refused to specify a date for the return. She might make it one year or a hundred, as she chose. China's contention was that her entrance into the war against Germany, even at a late date, abrogated any treaty that she had with the vanquished power and that therefore Kiao-Chau reverted to her automatically, and that the railway and mining concessions were likewise abrogated. So strongly did she feel on the subject that her delegates asserted that they had received instructions from their government not to sign the treaty, if their claims were not granted. Had the matter been open to free and fair debate, the decision of the conference on the conflicting claims might have been different. But it soon developed that the Allied powers were pledged in advance to support the claims of Japan. It was wholly unknown to the American dele- gates that a treaty had been entered into in 1917, between Japan and Great Britain, Russia, France, and Italy, by which the four latter Powers agn^eed to support Japan's claims at the Conference in reference to Shantung, in return for Japan's undertaking to permit China to enter the war. The existence of this secret treaty was only revealed in an- swer to a casual question of President Wilson. Under these conditions, it was a foregone conclusion that the decision would go against China. It was officially announced, on April 30, 1919, that the Shantung Peninsula and Kiao-Chau were to be given without reserve to Japan, who in turn was to withdraw her mili- tary forces and ultimately return to China full sovereignty over the dis- puted territory. The point was made that instead of doing this at the summary command of the Peace Conference, Japan should do it in her own way and at her own time as a free agent. No date was specified, as Japan objected to this as a reflection on her good faith. Besides the railroad and other concessions that she held as the legatee of Germany, Japan was to be allowed to establish a settle- ment at Tsing-tao, south of Kiao-Chau. The decision aroused great resentment among the Chinese delegates. They cabled to Peking for instructions and were told not to sign the treaty, the intimation being given that if they did, their lives would not be safe on their return to China. Excitement and dis- orders broke out in Chinese cities and protests poured in from Chinese com- munities and associations all over the world. A special additional commission was sent to Paris to urge the Conference to reconsider its decision. Members of the commission expressed the conviction that if Japan controlled the rich Shan- tung province, with what was considered the best seaport of the Republic, sho would soon dominate northern China
