in the mean time would urge him from his work, and every different want call him a different way. Diſeaſe, nay even miſfortune, would be death; for though neither might be mortal, yet either would diſable him from living, and reduce him to a ſtate in which he might rather be ſaid to periſh, than to die.
Thus neceſſity, like a gravitating power, would ſoon form our newly arrived emigrants into ſociety, the reciprocal bleſſings of which would ſuperſede, and render the obligations of law and government unneceſſary, while they remained perfectly juſt to each other: But as nothing but heaven is impregnable to vice, it will unavoidably happen, that in proportion as they ſurmount the firſt difficulties of emigration, which bound them together in a common cauſe, they will begin to relax in their duty and attachment to each other: And this remiſſneſs will point out the neceſſity of eſtabliſhing ſome form of government, to ſupply the defect of moral virtue.
Some convenient tree will afford them a ſtate-houſe, under the branches of which the whole colony may aſſemble to deliberate on public matters. It is more than probable that their firſt laws will have the title only of Regulations, and be enforced by no other penalty than public diſ-eſteem. In this firſt Parliament every man by natural right will have a ſeat.
But as the colony encreaſes, the public concerns will encreaſe likewiſe, and the diſtance at which the members may be ſeparated, will render it too inconvenient for all of them to meet on every occaſion as at firſt, when their number was ſmall, their habitations near, and the public concerns few and trifling. This will point out the convenience of their conſenting to leave the legiſlative part to be managed by a ſelect number choſen from the whole body, who are ſuppoſed to have the ſame concerns at ſtake which thoſe have who appointed them, and who will act in the ſame manner as the whole body would act, were they preſent. If the colony continue encreaſing, it will become neceſſary to augment the number of the repreſentatives, and that the intereſt of every part of the colony may be attended to, it will be found beſt to divide the whole into convenient parts, each part ſending its proper number: And that the elected might never form to themſelves an intereſt ſeparate from the electors, prudence will point out the propriety of having elections often; becauſe as the elected might by that means return and mix again with the general body of the electors in a few months, their fidelity to the public will be ſecured by the prudent reflection of not making a rod for themſelves. And as this frequent interchange will eſtabliſh a common intereſt with every part of the community, they will mutually and naturally ſupport each other, and on this (not on the unmeaning name of King) depends the ſtrength of government, and the happineſs of the governed.
Here then is the riſe and origin of government; namely a mode rendered neceſſary by the inability of moral virtue to govern the world; here too is the
