hoped to get ammunition that way from Norfolk in time to act in conjunction with the fort. I was sent to Roanoke island to communicate all this to Colonel Shaw, and confess I did not relish my mission. It looked too much like leaving the army in the lurch; and yet to have remained without ammunition would have been greater folly. About 9 p. m. our squadron got under weigh, all lights were extinguished, and we sailed for Elizabeth City, the Seabird towing the Forest."
On February 8th, Roanoke island was taken possession of by the enemy. Colonel Scharf says:
Thus Roanoke island was lost. It was the key to all the rear defenses of Norfolk; it unlocked two sounds (Albemarle and Currituck), eight rivers (North, West, Pasquotank, Perquimans, Little, Chowan, Roanoke and Alligator), four canals (the Albemarle & Chesapeake, the Dismal Swamp, the Northwest and the Norfolk), and two railroads (the Petersburg & Norfolk and the Seaboard & Roanoke). It guarded more than four-fifths of Norfolk's supplies of corn, pork, and forage, and its loss cut off the command of General Huger from all its most efficient transportation. Its possession by the enemy endangered the existence of Huger 's army, threatened the navy yard at Gosport, and might cut off Norfolk from Richmond, and both from railroad communication with the South Atlantic States.
Roanoke island was not well defended. The forts should have been at the Marshes, and our vessels should have met Goldsborough's fleet there. But as it was, the army should have thrown up intrenchments and dug ditches at the place where it was almost certain the enemy would land. By concealing the men and not firing a shot until the boats reached the shore, the landing might have been prevented. Colonel Shaw had, it is true, few men; but there seems to have been no reason why General Wise should not reinforce him. It is very certain that Flag-Officer Goldsborough would never have attempted to run by the forts with his vessels. The
