In front of this position there was a good range for artillery, and on its left (west) the plateau falls off abruptly into a ravine. Expecting attack from the front and left of his position, McClellan made those points strongest and massed his artillery there, sixty pieces of artillery and ten siege guns being "so disposed on the high ground that a concentrated fire could be brought to bear on any point in his front or left. Commodore Rodgers placed his flotilla to command both flanks. The general line faced north and was nearly at right angles to the line of McClellan’s retreat from Frayser’s farm and distant about 3½ miles from that battlefield.
Before this unassailable position General Lee brought up his whole army. He resolved to attack with Magruder, Holmes and Huger, holding A. P. Hill and Longstreet in reserve. To Magruder was assigned the attack on Porter’s position the strongest on Malvern hill supported by Holmes, whose small division was in line on Magruder’s right, facing east. The attack was planned by Lee to be general along his whole line; Holmes, then Magruder, then Huger, then Jackson. In spite of McClellan’s artillery, if this attack could have been made by noon, and made by the whole line in a grand charge for the batteries, the Federal army, already so terribly shaken, would have been unable to resist it, and Lee's antagonist would have been literally driven to his gunboats. Instead of all this, no attack was made until late in the evening. Holmes did not attach at all, deeming it "perfect madness;" Magruder and Huger, from the difficulty of communication with their commands, and the wooded character of the country, put in their brigades one after another, to charge across the open and up Malvern hill against nearly one hundred guns, supported by the Federal army, in full view, with the field and the woods swept by the gunboat batteries. Jackson sent D. H. Hill and Whiting forward, in order, and supported them with brigades from his own and
