early on the 16th, that first warned Pemberton of his situation.
Not regarding the early attack on Loring as more than a reconnoissance, Pemberton at first ordered a continuance of his movement toward Bolton, and Reynolds’ brigade was detailed to protect the wagon train. But the demonstrations of the enemy soon becoming more serious, the line of march was transformed into a line of battle. The position on the transverse road happened to be a strong one, covering the approaches of all the Federal troops. Col. Wirt Adams, with his cavalry, had been skirmishing in front of Reynolds. Lee’s brigade came up about 7:30 a. m. and most of Reynolds’ brigade was sent toward Edwards to protect the train, and no longer participated in the fighting. Tilghman’s brigade, which had been in the rear, was stationed before the bridge on the Raymond road. The position which Lee took involved him in heavy skirmishing, and the enemy developed toward his left flank, threatening the Clinton toad into Edwards. Stevenson brought up Cumming to Lee’s right, and Barton to the right of the latter.
According to General Stevenson’s report, "the enemy, in columns of divisions, moved steadily around our left, forcing it to change direction to correspond, and their movement was so rapid as to keep my line (a single one) in constant motion by the left flank." Finally Barton was sent to support Lee, who was fighting at the critical point. "About half past ten," according to Stevenson's report, "a division of the enemy in column of brigades attacked Lee and Cumming. They were handsomely met and forced back some distance, where they were reinforced by about three divisions, two of which moved forward to the attack, and the third continued its march toward the left, with the intention of forcing it. The enemy now made a vigorous attack in three lines upon the whole front. They were bravely met, and for a long time the unequal conflict was maintained with stub-
