articles, in " Battles and Leaders," and finally in his book. The lofty determination to exonerate Lee at his own expense was gradually transformed into assertions—before quoted—that his old chief was not a master of offensive battle;47 that "in the field his characteristic fault was headlong combativeness ";48 that "in the immediate presence of the enemy General Lee's mind, at all other times calm and clear, became excited"; 49 and that the fighting at Gettysburg had to go on until "blood enough was shed to appease him." 50
But Longstreet's attitude towards some of his comrades in arms shows even more unpleasant features than his attitude towards his beloved commander. And let me repeat that these things must be insisted on because they indicate such a fatal and such an instructive flaw in a nature of unusual depth and power. The proposed duel with A. P. Hill early in the war, if it really was proposed, sprang from pride in his troops as much as in himself.51 No such excuse will avail for his cruel language towards Early. It is true that Early had criticized him; but just here Longstreet's weakness comes out most. Early, in explaining his criticisms later, says with noble and Christian charity, "You will observe that in my article there is some causticity of expression, which was provoked by the character of the article I was replying to. I now sincerely regret the necessity which called forth the personal strictures contained in my replies, and would be glad if they could be eliminated." 52 Yet Longstreet, writing his
