Page:Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part IV) Examining the Biden Administration’s Counterterrorism Strategy.pdf/2

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

Statement of

Brad Wiegmann
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice

And

Timothy Langan
Assistant Director
Counterterrorism Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Before the
Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Committee on Oversight and Reform
U.S. House of Representatives

At a Hearing Entitled

“Confronting Violent White Supremacy (Part IV): Examining the Biden
Administration’s Counterterrorism Strategy”

September 29, 2021

Good morning Chairman Raskin, Ranking Member Roy, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, and thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department of Justice regarding the National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism. Protecting the American people from terrorism and other national security threats has long been the top priority of the Department.

The nature of the threat posed by terrorism – both international and domestic – continues to evolve. The greatest terrorism threat to our Homeland today is posed by lone actors or small cells who typically radicalize online and look to attack soft targets with easily accessible weapons. We see these threats manifested in both Domestic Violent Extremists (“DVEs”) and Homegrown Violent Extremists (“HVEs”), two distinct threats both of which arise in the United States. Individuals who seek to commit violent criminal acts in furtherance of social or political goals stemming from domestic influences – such as racial or ethnic bias, or anti-government or anti-authority sentiments – are described as DVEs, whereas HVEs are individuals inspired primarily by foreign terrorist groups, but not receiving individualized direction from those groups.

Both DVEs and HVEs are often motivated by a mix of socio-political, ideological, and personal grievances, and have focused on readily accessible targets to include houses of worship, retail establishments, and mass public gatherings. The vulnerability of these soft targets, the insular nature of the process by which these individuals radicalize and mobilize to violence, and the limited discussions they typically have with others regarding their plans increase the challenge faced by law enforcement to detect and disrupt these plots before they can cause harm.