Page:Copyright Law Revision (Senate Report No. 94-473).djvu/123

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during the 28 years immediately preceding the effective date of the act (January 1, 1977). In addition, it would extend by varying lesser amounts the duration of renewal copyrights already extended under Public Laws 81-688, 89-142, 90-141, 90-416, 91-147, 91-555, 92-170, 92-566, and Public Law 3-573, all of which would otherwise expire on December 31, 1976. The subsection would also extend the duration of renewal copyrights whose second 28-year term is scheduled to expire during 1976. In none of these cases, however, would the total terms of copyright for the working be longer than 75 years.

The reference to a “posthumous work” in this section means one as to which no assignment has occurred during an author’s lifetime, rather than one which is simply first published after the author’s death.

Subsection (b) also covers the special situation of a subsisting first-term copyright that becomes eligible for renewal registration during the year before the act comes into effect. If a renewal registration is not made before the effective date, the case is governed by the provisions of section 304(a). If a renewal registration is made during the year before the new law takes effect, however, the copyright would be treated as if it were already subsisting in its second term and would be extended to the full period of 75 years without the need for further renewal.

Termination of grants covering extended term

An issue underlying the 19-year extension of renewal terms under both subsections (a) and (b) of section 304 is whether, in a case where their rights have already been transferred, the author or his dependents should be given a chance to benefit from the extended term. The arguments for granting a right of termination are even more persuasive under section 304 then they are under section 203; the extended term represents a completely new property right, and there are strong reasons for giving the author, who is the fundamental beneficiary of copyright under the Constitution, an opportunity to share in it.

Subsection (c) of section 304 is a close but not exact counterpart of section 203. In the case of either a first-term or renewal copyright already subsisting when the new statute becomes effective, any grant of rights covering the renewal copyright in the work, executed before the effective date, may be terminated under conditions and limitations similar to those provided in section 203. Except for transfers and licenses covering renewal copyrights already extended under Public Laws 87-668, 89-142, 90-141, 90-416, 91-147, 91-555, 92-170, 92-566, and Public Law 93-573, which would become subject to termination immediately upon the coming into effect of the revised law, the 5-year period during which termination could be made effective would start 56 years after copyright was originally secured.

The bill distinguished between the person who can terminate a grant under section 203 and those entitled to terminate a grant covering an extended term under section 304. Instead of being limited to transfers and licenses executed by the author, the right of termination under section 304(c) also extends to grants executed by those beneficiaries of the author who can claim renewal under the present law: his widow, children, executors, or next of kin.

There is good reason for this difference. Under section 203, an author’s widow and children are given rights of termination if the