Opinion of the Court
applied this principle for over a century. See, e.g., Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U. S. 157, 165 (1917) (holding that a state ground was adequate where it was not “without fair support, or so unfounded as to be essentially arbitrary, or merely a device to prevent a review of the other [federal] ground of the judgment”). And this Court has continued to reaffirm this important rule. See Walker v. Martin, 562 U. S. 307, 320 (2011) (“A state ground, no doubt, may be found inadequate when ‘discretion has been exercised to impose novel and unforeseeable requirements without fair or substantial support in prior state law’ ” (quoting 16B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4026, p. 386 (2d ed. 1996) (Wright & Miller))).
At issue here is the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision that Cruz’s motion for postconviction relief failed to satisfy Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g). Rule 32.1(g) allows defendants to file a successive or untimely postconviction petition if there has been “a significant change in the law.” Arizona courts have interpreted that phrase to require a “transformative event, a ‘clear break from the past.’ ” Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 118, 203 P. 3d, at 1178 (quoting State v. Slemmer, 170 Ariz. 174, 182, 823 P. 2d 41, 49 (1991) (some internal quotation marks omitted)). “The archetype of such a change occurs when an appellate court overrules previously binding case law.” Ibid.
Straightforward application of these principles should have led to the conclusion that Lynch was a “significant change in the law” under Rule 32.1(g). Lynch overruled binding Arizona precedent. Before Lynch, Arizona courts held that capital defendants were not entitled to inform the jury of their parole ineligibility. After Lynch, Arizona courts recognize that capital defendants have a due process right to provide the jury with that information when future dangerousness is at issue. It is hard to imagine a clearer break from the past.
