Page:Cruz v. Arizona (2023).pdf/21

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CRUZ v. ARIZONA

Barrett, J., dissenting

change in the application of the law.” 251 Ariz. 203, 207, 487 P. 3d 991, 995 (2021). By that standard, Lynch did not satisfy Rule 32.1(g). 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995.

The Court criticizes the “novelty” of the Arizona Supreme Court’s law versus application-of-law distinction, as it does not appear in any other Arizona precedent. Ante, at 9. A point that deserves emphasis at the outset: Novelty does not mean that a rule is inadequate merely because a state court announced it for the first time in the decision under review, and I do not understand the Court to suggest otherwise. Legal systems based on precedent depend on cases to present novel fact patterns, which enable courts to articulate new principles of law or to clarify old ones with greater precision. Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. 53, 65 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring). We do a disservice to that mode of legal development when we “disregard a state procedural ground that was not in all respects explicit before the case when it was first announced”—unless, of course, the decision demonstrates “a purpose or pattern to evade constitutional guarantees.” Ibid. That is why we have been careful to explain that, in the inadequacy context, a decision is “ ‘novel’ ” only when it was wholly “ ‘unforeseeable’ ” and lacked any “ ‘fair or substantial support in prior state law.’ ” Walker, 562 U. S., at 320 (quoting 16B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4026, p. 386 (2d ed. 1996)).

The Court’s real objection is that it thinks the Arizona Supreme Court violated its own Rule 32.1(g) precedent by holding that Lynch is not a significant change in law. For one, the Court says, the Arizona Supreme Court has previously explained that “ ‘ [t]he archetype ’ ” of a significant change occurs “ ‘ when an appellate court overrules previously binding case law, ’ ” and Lynch overruled binding Arizona case law. Ante, at 8 (quoting Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 118, 203 P. 3d, at 1178). In isolation, that language does suggest that Lynch is a “significant change” for purposes of Rule