Syllabus
(b) Counterarguments presented in this case offer various reformulations of the argument that Lynch was not a “significant change in the law” for Rule 32.1(g) purposes, but they fail to grapple with the basic point that Lynch reversed previously binding Arizona Supreme Court precedent. The fact that Lynch was a summary reversal did not justify the Arizona Supreme Court in treating Lynch differently than other transformative decisions of this Court. Although Lynch did not change this Court’s interpretation of Simmons, it did change the operation of Simmons by Arizona courts in a way that matters for Rule 32.1(g). And it makes no difference that Lynch did not alter federal law. The analytic focus of Arizona courts applying Rule 32.1(g) has always been on the impact to Arizona law. Nor does this Court’s interpretation forestall Arizona’s ability to develop its Rule 32.1(g) jurisprudence in new contexts. That the Arizona Supreme Court had never before applied Rule 32.1(g) to a summary reversal did not present a new context in this case. Finally, no effective parallel can be drawn between Rule 32.1(g) and very different procedural rules governing federal prisoners, e.g., 28 U. S. C. §§2255(f), (h). Pp. 11–14.
251 Ariz. 203, 487 P. 3d 991, vacated and remanded.
