Summary
For the first summary, let us stress that as long as this model creates
a highly competitive environment, publishers have to fight to
develop brand names. A publisher may achieve this by trying to:
(a) always be first, (b) offer the best in terms of quality to the
public, or (c) sponsor authors instead of “freeloading,” thereby
providing additional incentives to authors.
It is noteworthy that as far as all works are accessible to all
publishers, the success of an author depends solely on his talent. If
an author lacks talent, no one suffers but the author.
Actually, I used to think that no-regulation environment would
be much worse than it appears now. It looks as if it could result in a
fairly self-tuned market that would be extremely challenging for all
parties. It is unlikely that any work of art may escape unnoticed in
this environment.
A Historical Excursus
The Self-tuning model is based entirely on contractual law. If this
model were in place, publishers with considerable economic power
would eventually plot to contract authors and publish in a
copyright-like manner. That is, they would try to get rid of
competition and secure their portfolios and revenues for a certain
period of time. The next step would be an attempt to gain
government support for that “copyright-like manner” in order to
hinder authors from dictating conditions. This is what happened in
Great Britain with the Statute of Queen Anne in 1710.
For about two hundred years before that, the Crown had resisted
the demands of licensed scribes (and later big printers) to limit
printing and restrict the spread of the printing press. In 1710, the
Crown was eager to get rid of anonymous pamphlet writers; this
desire by the government for effectual censorship coincided with big
printers’ thirst for easy money. That mutual interest brought about
the Statute of Anne. It is ironic that the same law in its basic features
was later adopted in the U.S. in order to provide for “the progress of
science and useful arts.”
