Nature; are so far combined with particular Circumstances, e. g. their Cause, Effects, &c. that their Names become none of the least complex.
NOW, what we call a Term, consider'd as to its Nature and Origin, is no other than "a Word which denotes an Assemblage, or System of Ideas relating to some one Point, which the Mind artfully complicates or associates together, for the conveniency of its own Operations." Or, "a Word which comprehends several Ideas under a certain Relation to each other, whereby they represent some complex piece of Knowledge to the Mind for the conveniency," &c. Or, "it is a Word, which holds several different Ideas combin'd together in a Relation such as they appear'd under when the Mind first consider'd 'em as a standing Phænomenon, and took Meaſures to have 'em fix'd or retain'd in that Quality."
THE Effect of Terms is, that by virtue thereof, we are enabled to receive, or communicate Knowledge with more ease and dispatch; forasmuch as having proper Combinations thereof always ready made, we are saved the Necessity of beginning de novo, and detailing it in Individuals: much as in Arithmetick, to avoid the Embarrass of a large Number of Units, we tell by Tens, or Sixties, or Hundreds: With the like View, on some occasions, we make up certain Sums of Money in Rouleaus, or in Purses; and thus pay and receive 'em, without the Trouble of telling or enumerating the Contents.
IN this Sense of Term, we shall find little else but Terms in Language: Among Nouns, little beside proper Names, which indeed are out of the ordinary Case of Language, as serving occasionally to denote an hundred different Subjects. Yet even these sometimes become Terms; as, when any particular Ideas become constantly attach'd to 'em, e. g. In Mecenas, Machiavel, Augustus, Atlas, Bucephalus, Buscentaur, Royal Oak, Argo, &c. And among Verbs, very few but are Terms, except the general ones, to be, to do, and to suffer. As all the others suppose these, and modify or superadd some farther Circumstance thereto; they commence Terms of course: such, for instance, is the Word to moisten; which, as it carries a farther meaning than the bare Act of applying a Fluid to a dry Body; and denotes, e. g. the Modus of its Effect, and the Alteration superinduced by it, viz. the softening, lubricating, &c. is a good Term. So, to strike, as it not only implies a certain Motion of the Arm, but this Motion, effected by the successive Contraction and Dilatation of certain Muscles, &c. has every thing that is essential to a Term. In the same Sense, a Staff is a Term as much as a Lever; and a Pin, as an Axis in peritrochio.
THIS may look like stretching a Point, especially to those who are used to consider Terms as Things, I know not how, quaint, and mysterious; and make a Term and a hard Word the same thing. But there is no Remedy: Complexness is the only Characteristic that will be found to hold good of 'em all; and if there be any other more specifick and distinguishing Properties in most of 'em, as we shall have occasion hereafter to shew there are, yet these, not being universal, cannot be made the Foundation of a just Philosophical Definition. They may perhaps be introduced, to good purpose, into a popular one; as they afford a more useful and adequate Knowledge of the Subject so far as they do obtain.
THUS much relates to what we may call Terms of Knowledge, which are one degree more simple than the Terms of an Art, or Science; and were, for that Reason, pitch'd upon to exhibit the common Nature, and Origin of both. These latter arise out of the former, by the Superaddition of some new Character, or Condition. They were before Members of the Commonwealth of Knowledge; but are now incorporated into some certain Province, or City thereof; where they become of farther Significance and Consideration than before: that is, some new Ideas and Circumstances are now taken into the Combination, which before did not belong to it—-A Term of Art, then, "is a Word that has a Meaning beyond its general, or scientifical one; and this Meaning restrain'd to some one Art." Or, it is "a Word used to denote a certain "Combination of Ideas, under some peculiar Relation; retained arbitrarily in some Art, and either not uſed in any other Art, or for a different Combination, or with other Relations and Circumstances."
TO make the way a little clearer to the Philosophy of a Term of Art, it is to be observ'd, that from the primary or literal Sense of Words, we frequently, by Abſtraction, form a secondary, general, or philosophical one, expressing only the Quality most predominant in the former, exclusive of the particular Circumstances of the Concrete. Thus the Word Spirit, literally and primarily signifying Breath; we thence frame a more simple general meaning, and uſe the Word for any thin, subtil Matter whatever.----Now, Terms of Art are not immediately formed from the literal, or grammatical, but from the general, or philosophical, Acceptations of Words; which are their proper Basis, or the Ground-work they are erected on. The general or abstract Sense of some Word already established, being found to agree to something which we have occasion to give a Name to; we take the Word in that Sense, and superadd the other Incidents and Circumstances which the present Occasions furnish, thereto which being different according to the different Matter and Subject of the Art, specify the meaning of the Term in this, or that Art. So that the Word which, to raise it to a philosophical or scientifical Sense, was generaliz'd; to form a Technical one is again particulariz'd, or appropriated, and invested with new Accidents. Which falls in with the Difference above laid down between Art and Science.
THUS, the same Word Spirit, which literally signifies Breath, and philosophically any subtil Substance, is technically brought to denote diverſe other things; as, in Anatomy, a thin animal Juice secreted in the Brain, and detach'd thence thro' the Nerves for the Uses of Sensation and muscular Motion in Chymistry, the Exhalations of Bodies expos'd to the Fire: in Theology, the third Person of the Trinity in Metaphysicks, any incorporeal Agent, or Intelligence, &c. In all which, we fee the same Substratum, viz. a fine subtil Substance; but this modified a great diversity of ways: each of which is susceptible, by farther Super-additions, of infinite more. And hence Legions of forts of Spirits, both in the human Body, the Chymists Laboratories, the Hierarchy, &c.
THE Notion of a Term will receive some farther Light from that of a DEFINITION; which is, as it were, the Analysis thereof.----By Definition we undo, what was done in the Term; that is, we resolve the complex Ideas into simple ones, or restore the Ideas from their new and artificial State, to their primitive and vague one. A Definition, then, may be defined, "an Enumeration of the several simple Ideas couched under any Term, in the Relation wherein they stand to one another.". -----We have already shewn, that Terms are Words which have peculiar and determinate Meanings, resulting from a certain Combination of Ideas; in which view, a Term may be said to be, "a Word that is capable of Definition;" i. e. of having its Sense explain'd, and ascertained by an Enumeration of its Properties, and Relations by which it is distinguifh'd from other Words merely grammatical, whose Meanings are general and indeterminate, and may be used with equal propriety in a thousand Cases. We can explain a Term: A Word is inexplicable: all we can do towards this, amounts not to Definition, but only to Substitution.
THUS the Idea attached, for instance, to the Word Force, is absolutely incommunicable by means of any Language; we can only try whether the Party have it not already, under another Name; to which end we may tell him 'tis Power, or Energy, or Vigour; if he have Ideas for any of these, he'll take in that of Force, by its Relation thereto; if he have not, we must proceed to try him with more, and tell him 'tis Forza, orVis,
