KNO (4*>)
The Phyficians fometimes call 'em
KNO
in the Bladder, Tcfhi.
Knot, or Nodus, is alfo ufed for the Intrigue of a Ro- mance or Dramatic Piece : that is, for that part where the Perfons are the moll embarafs'd, by a Conjuncture of Affairs whole End it is not eafy to forefee. Arijioile, under this Term, includes all the Incidents of a Tragedy) from itsEeginning to the Place where it begins to unravel! The Knot holds as long as the Mind is kept fufpended on the Event. The Knot ought always to laft to the middle of the fitth Acl, otherwife the relf of the Piece becomes feeble and languifhinp.
- , r , ^. .7 „ ..«.. w tiiuie iwiuicuiate Kiel's wtlprp
Order of the Knot., the Name of a Military Order in the or Difaoreement of thofe in ,L P~L.s. Kingdom of Naples, inflituted in the Year rjjz, by Queen perceived ! • W by reme, ' ? V !**"™ ™ « firft
TrHths where the Ideas themfelves, by an irnmediate View, difcovertheir Agreement or Difagreement one with another 1 he other is of fuch Truths, whereof the Mind having been convinced, it retains the Memory of the Conviction, without the Proofs. Thus a Man 'that remembers certainly, that he once perceived the De- monllration, That the three Angles of a Triangle are e- qual to two right ones, knows it' to be true, when that Demonflration is gone out of his Mind, and cannot poffi- bly be recollefled : But he knows it in a different way from what he did befote, namely, not by the Interven- tion of thofe immediate Ideas, whereby the Agreement
3««el. on occaiion of the Peace etiablilh'd between her and the King of Hungary, by means of her Marriage with Louts Prince of Tarentum. The Order confuted of fixty Knights. Clement VI. approved this Order, and gave it the Rule of St. Bafil : It chofe St. Nicholas for its Protector, but dwindled away after the Death of its Foundrefs.
KNOWLEDGE, according toMr.JLocie, confifls in the Perception of the Connexion and Agreement, or Dif- agrecment and Repugnancy of our Ideas. Thus we know that White is not Black, by perceiving that thefe two Ideas do not agree. Again, in knowing that the three An- gles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones ; what do we more than perceive that Equality to two right ones doth neceflarily agree to, and is infeparable from the three Angles of a Triangle ? As to the Agreement or Difagreement of Ideas, we may reduce the whole Doc- trine, (confcquently the whole Stock of our Knowledge) to thefe four Heads ; viz. Identity orDiverfity, Relation, Co-exittence, and Real Exillence.
With regard to the Identity or Diverlity of our Ideas, we may obferve, That 'tis the firfl Acl of the Mind' to perceive its own Ideas, and fo far as it perceives them, to^ know each what it is, and thereby to perceive their difference, that is, the one not to be the other : By this the Mind clearly perceives each Idea to agree with it- felf, and to be what it is ; and all diilina Ideas to dis- agree. This it docs without any Pains or Deduclion, by its natural Power of Perception, and Diftinclion ; and this Men of Art have reduced to thofe general Rules mz. What is, is ; and, It is impoffiblc for the fame thing to be, and not to be. But no Maxim can make a Man know it clearer, that Round is not Square, than the bare Per-
_. by remembring, that is, knowing, that he was once certain of the Truth of this Propofition, 1 hat the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones The Immutability of the fame Relations be- tween the fame immutable things, is now the Idea, that Ihews him, that if the three Angles of a Trianole were once equal to two right ones, they will always be fo. And hence he comes to be certain, that what was once true, is always true ; what Ideas once agreed, will al- ways agree ; and confequently, what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true, as long as he cart remember that he once knew it.
As to the different Degrees, or Clearnefs of our Know- ledge u feems to lie in the different way which the Mind has of perceiving the Agreement or Difagreement of any of its Ideas. When the Mind perceives this Agreement Of Disagreement of two Ideasimmediately by themfelves, without the Intervention of any other, we may call it Inttii- nveKnowledgejn which Cafes the Mind perceives the Truth, as the Eye doth Light, only by being dircfled towards ir. I husthe Mind perceives, that White is not Black ; that three are more than two, and equal to one and two. This Part of Knowledge is irrcfitiible, and, like the bright Sun-lhine, forces itfelf immediately to be per- ceived, as Toon as ever the Mind turns its View that way. It is on this Intuition that depends all the Certainty and Evidence of our other Knowledge, which Certainty eve- ry one finds to be fo grear, that he cannot imagine, and therefore cannot require a greater. The next Degree of Knowledge is, where the Mind perceives not this Agree- ment or Difagreement immediately, or by the Juxta-Po- fitiun, as it were, of the Ideas, becaufe thofe Ideas, con- cerning whofe Agreement or Difagreement the Enfluir
ever ; that is, their Agreement or Difagreement one with another, in the feveral ways or refpects the Mind takes of comparing them._ The third fort of Agreement or Difagreement to be found in our Ideas, is Co-exifle:
And thus if we would know the A- greement or Difagreement in Bignefs, between the three Angles of a Triangle, and two right Angles, we cannot do it by an immediate View and Comparifon of them.becaufe
ameSubjcfl, and this belong, tV}™ t^!° UT ^} e ™
particularly to Subliances. Thus' when we pronounc. concerning Gold that it is fixed, it amounts to no more but this, that Fixedncfs, or a Power to remain in the Fire un- confumed, is an Idea that always accompanies that par- ticular Sort of Yellowncfs, Weight, Fufibility, life, which makes our complex Idea fignified by the' word Cold. The fourth Sort is thatof actual and real Exillence, agreeing to any Idea. Within thefe four Sorts of Agree- ment or Difagreement, feems contained all the Know- ledge we have, or are capable of; for all that we know
or can affirm concerning any Idea, is, That it is, or is not and' to apply theln rich the fame with fomeother ; as that Blue is not Yellow : This Knowledge, tho it "h
at once, and compared with any other one or two An- gles ; and fo of this the Mind has no immediate, or in- tuitive Knowledge. But we mull find out fome other Angles, to which the three Angles of a Triangle have E- quality ; and finding thofe equal to two right ones, we come to know the Equality of thefe three Angles to two right ones. Thofe intervening Ideas, which fe'rve to /hew the Agreement of any two others, are called Proofs J and where the Agreement or Difagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called De-
™"f™T"\ A iP^. ickn [ fs i - nthe Mind t0 find thofe Proofs >
that which is called Sagacity. e certain, is not fo clear and
that it does or does not co-exilt with another ,n the fame evident as intuitive Knowledge ; i t requires Pains and At
Subjeft ; as that Iron ,s fufcept.ble of magnetical Impref- ten.ion, and Heady Application of Moid, to difcover the
fZ ' Th! it T T tU Relat "", ? /°T ° ther Agreement or Difagreement of the Idea t confiders and
Ideas, as That two Triangles, upon equal Bafes between there mull be a Progreffion by Steps and Deerce before
v^out tttT Th" God'," HaS * rCal ExiftenCC Sffrati:,;" "**" "^ <° L ^~ ^
The Mind becomes poffeffed of Truth in feveral man
A'ay t there was
Befon
ners, each of which comes under the Term Knowledge. Thus when the Mind has a prefent View of the Agreement or Difagreement of any of its Ideas, or of the Relation they have one with another, it is called aflual Knowledge. Secondly, A Man is faid to know any Propofition, when having once evidently perceived the Agreement or Difa- greement of the Ideas whereof it confifls, and fo lodged it in his Memory, that whenever it comes to be reflecled on ag: ' tion call
faidto knowM thofe Iruhs which are lodged in his Knowledge, h Memory by a foregoing, clear, and full Perception. Of perceives, th H abitual Knowledge there are two forts ; the one confifh of fuch Truths laid up in the Memory, as whenever they
e to any Certainty.
Doubt, which, in intuitive Knowledge, cannot happen to the Mind, that has its Facul- ty of Perception left in a Degree capable of diflinfl Ideas no more than it can be a Doubt to the Eye fthat can diflinflly fee White and Black) whether this Ink and I aper be all of a Colour. Now in every Step that Rea- fon makes in Demonflrative Knowledge, there is an In- tuitive Knowledge of that Agreement or Difagreement it feeks with the next intermediate Idea, which it ufes as a
ery Step in Kealonmg, that produceth
as intuitive Certainty ; which when the Mind
perceives, there is no more required but to remember it
to make the Agreement or Difagreement of the Ideas'
concerning which we enquire, vifible and certain. This
occur.to the Mind, it a£lually perceives the Relation to^ZK^J^Tig^ or that . between their Ideas; and this is m .11 thofe of the intermediate Ideas i TSstep anS fcffioa
of
