Page:David Atkins - The Economics of Freedom (1924).pdf/21

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Introduction

The following essays are an attempt to draw a dividing line (upon paper, at any rate) between politics and economics, by which politics, as now practiced, is set aside for serious attention as a likely factor of friction, while economics is isolated as a logical science dealing, under democracy, with the measurement of liberated human effort. Such a divorce leaves the art of politics with all the advantages of a going-concern at the moment; and the science of economics is withdrawn so far from immediate possible application that some difficulty may be experienced in imagining any renewed relationship.

For democracy, politics, as a means of obtaining sectional advantage, should be a dead art. The essential policy of democracy is the protection of our reopened ways for the sake of individual freedom, and this policy must be maintained with a definite regard for dynamic law if it is to be of any general advantage. During the long and costly struggle for individual freedom the desperate maneuvering we have known as “politics” has been a reaction—induced and defensive—against arbitrary interference with the free functioning of the individual. The campaign started as a fight for general freedom as opposed to autocratic privilege; but the militantly disposed, after their habit, have not laid down their arms with victory, and they continue to parade, competing among themselves for place and advantage, much to the confusion of honest and hardworking citizens who were ready to make use of their liberty, if they had been permitted.

“Political-economy” was a thoroughly well-justified name for the baffling study of economic resultants impaired by irresponsible autocratic policies. Between the lines of old works on political-economy may be read implied strictures (which could not be made openly) upon autocratic manipulation; and the friendly relationship of the political-economist to the Court was seriously affected if the criticism were sufficiently obvious to be comprehended. This was a very bad start for the literary

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