times is friendly of and in itself." ‘’Oh pudenda origo!’’ (How humble the beginning!) Is not this like fancying that the miscrable, occasional, often accidental relation of another to ourselves is his inner and most essential quality; and like pretending that, with regard to all the world and his own self, he is only capable of relations similar to those we have experienced once or several times? And is there not behind this true folly the most immodest mental reservation lurking, namely that we ourselves must be the principle of all good things, because we are the standard of good and evil ?
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There are two classes of deniers of morality.—”To deny morality" may mean, first, to deny that the moral motives which men adduce have really egged them on to their actions—hence it is like asserting that morality consists in words, and is part of the course and subtle deceit (especially self-deceit) of men, perhaps more especially of those who are most famed for their virtues. Secondly, we may deny that the moral judgments are based on truths. In this case we admit that they are real motives for action, but that errors, as foundations of all moral judgment, egg men on to their moral actions. This is my point of view: Yet I should be the last to deny that, in a great any cases, a nice suspicion in accordance with the former point of view, and therefore, in the spirit of La Rochefoucauld, is likewise justified,
