Page:Dawn of the Day.pdf/139

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SECOND BOOK
103

they encroached upon the sphere of our power, and would for ever have a hand in it, did we not, by means of "duty," practise retaliation, and thus encroach upon their power. The rights of others can only relate to that which is in our power; it would be unreasonable if they wanted something from us that does not belong to us. To express it more accurately, their rights relate only to that which they deem in our power, provided it be the same which we deem in our power. The same error might easily occur on either sile: the sense of duty depends on our having the same belief as the others with regard to the extent of our power: namely, that we can promise and bind ourselves to undertake certain things (“Freedom of will"). My own rights are that portion of my power which others have not only attributed to me, but wherein they even wish to maintain How do these others proceed? First, with prudence, fear and caution : be it that, in return, they either expect something similar from is (protection of their rights), or that they consider & contest with us as dangerous or purposeless; or that, in every diminution of our power, they see a disadvantage to themselves, in so far as we should thus become unfit for all alliance with them in opposition to a hostile third power. Secondly, by donation and cession. In this case, the others have power enough, and more than enough, to be able to surrender a portion thereof, and to guarantee the surrendered portion to him to whom they gave it: