denial, until, in form of adaptation to the whole, it again obtains its fixel sphere of rights and duties, until it has become something altogether new and different. Nothing less is aimed at—whether admitted or not—than thorough transformation, any, weakening and abrogation of the individual : there is an uncensing enumeration and accusing of all the wickedness and offensiveness, the lavishness, expense, and luxury of the traditional aspect of individual existence; it is hoped that everything may be managed in a cheaper, less dangerous, more uniform, and harmonious way, provided only that there are nothing but large bodies and their members. Everything which in any way corresponds to this all-productive craving and its subsidiary cravings, is considered as good—this is the moral ground-current of our age; sympathy and social feeling play into each other's hands. (Kant is still outside this movement: he expressly teaches that we ought to be callous to other people's suffering, if our beneficence is to have moral value—a precept which Schopenhauer, as may easily be understood, angrily calls Kant's absurdity.)
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To cease thinking of oneself.—Let us thoroughly revolve in our minds the reason why we jump after a person who, before our eyes, falls into the water, though we do not in the least care for him. For pity's sake we only think of him—so says thoughtlessness.
