knowledge, despite the certainty that first and immediately our freethinking will plunge them into doubt, grief and worse affliction. May we not at least deal with our neighbour just as we deal with ourselves ? And if, with regard to ourselves, we have no such narrow-minded and petty view on the immediate consequences and sufferings, why should we entertain it with regard to him? Suppose we had a mind to sacrifice ourselves: what would prevent us from sacrificing our neighbour along with ourselves ?—just as all along States and princes have sacrificed one citizen to the other “for the sake of the general interests,’’ they say. But we too have general, and perhaps more general interests; why then should a few individuals of the present generation not he sacrificed — for the good of future generations? Their grief, anxiety, despair, blunders, and distress may be deemed indispensable, while a new ploughshare breaks up the ground and makes it fertile for all. Finally: we communicate the same principles to our neighbour, in which he himself may feel as the victim; we persuade him to do the task for which we employ him. Are we then void of pity ? But though we may wish to conquer our pity in spite of ourselves, is not this a loftier and more liberal attitude and spirit than that one in which we feel safe after having fond out whether an action benefits or hurts our neighbour? On the contrary, by means of the sacrifice—in which both we and our neighbours are
