Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v1.djvu/398

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378
LUTHER MARTIN'S LETTER.

was agreed to in Convention; and so it was reported by the committee of detail, although a variety of attempts were made to alter that part of the system by those who were of a contrary opinion, in which they repeatedly failed; but, sir, by never losing sight of their object, and choosing a proper time for their purpose, they succeeded, at length, in obtaining the alteration, which was not made until within the last twelve days before the Convention adjourned.

As these propositions were agreed to by the committee of the whole house, the President was to be appointed by the national legislature; and, as it was reported by the committee of detail, the choice was to be made by ballot, in such a manner that the states should have an equal voice in the appointment of this officer, as they, of right, ought to have; but those who wished, as far as possible, to establish a national instead of a federal government, made repeated attempts to have the President chosen by the people at large. On this the sense of the Convention was taken, I think, not less than three times while I was there, and as often rejected; but within the last fortnight of their session, they obtained the alteration in the manner it now stands, by which the large states have a very undue influence in the appointment of the President. There is no case where the states will have an equal voice in the appointment of the President, except where two persons shall have an equal number of votes, and those a majority of the whole number of electors,—a case very unlikely to happen,—or where no person has the majority of the votes. In these instances, the House of Representatives are to choose by ballot, each state having an equal voice; but they are confined, in the last instance, to the five who have the greatest number of votes, which gives the largest states a very unequal chance of having the President chosen under their nomination.

As to the Vice-President,—that great officer of government, who is, in case of the death, resignation, removal, or inability, of the President, to supply his place, and be vested with his powers, and who is officially to be president of the Senate,—there is no provision by which a majority of the voices of the electors are necessary to his appointment; but after it is decided who is chosen President, that person who has the next number of votes of the electors is declared to be legally elected to the vice-presidency; so that, by this system, it is very possible, and not improbable, that he might he appointed by the electors of a single large state; and a very undue influence in the Senate is given to that state of which the Vice-President is a citizen, since, in every question where the Senate is divided, that state will have two votes—the president having, on those occasions, a casting voice. Every part of the system which relates to the Vice-President, as well as the present mode of electing the President, was introduced and agreed upon after I left Philadelphia.

Objections were made to that part of this article by which the President is appointed commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states; and it was wished to be so far restrained, that he should not command in person; but this could not be obtained. The power given to the President of granting reprieves and pardons was also thought extremely dangerous, and as such opposed. The President thereby has the power of pardoning those who are guilty of treason, as well as of other offences. It was said that no treason was so likely to take place as that in which the President himself might be engaged—the attempt to assume to himself powers not given by the