voluntary grant, cannot be extended farther than what this positive grant hath conveyed. You have been chosen by the people for the sole purpose of "assenting to and ratifying the Constitution proposed for the future government of the United States, with respect to their general and common concerns," or of rejecting it. It is a sacred trust; and as, on the one hand, you ought to weigh well the innovations it will create in the governments of the individual states, and the dangers which may arise by its adoption, so, upon the other hand, you ought fully to consider the benefits it may promise, and the consequences of a rejection of it. You have hitherto acted strictly conformably to your delegated power; you have agreed that a single question can come before you; and it has been accordingly moved that you resolve "to assent to and ratify this Constitution." Three weeks have been spent in hearing the objections that have been made against it, and it is now time to determine whether they are of such a nature as to overbalance any benefits or advantages that may be derived to the state of Pennsylvania by your accepting it.
Sir, I have as yet taken up but little of your time; notwithstanding this, I will endeavor to contract what occurs to me on the subject. And in what I have to offer, I shall observe this method: I will first consider the arguments that may have been used against this Constitution, and then give my reasons why I am for the motion.
The arguments against the Constitution are, I think, chiefly these:—
First. That the elections of representatives and senators are not frequent enough to insure responsibility to their constituents.
Second. That one representative for thirty thousand persons is too few.
Third. The Senate have a share in the appointment of certain officers, and are to be the judges on the impeachment of such officers. This is blending the executive with the legislative and judicial department, and is likely to screen the offenders impeached, because of the concurrence of a majority of the Senate in their appointment.
Fourth. That the Congress may, by law, deprive the electors of a fair choice of their representatives, by fixing improper times, places, and modes of election.
