Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v3.djvu/297

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Grayson.]
VIRGINIA.
281

women? I suppose the general government, as being paramount, would prevail. How are two legislatures to coincide, with powers transcendent, supreme, and omnipotent? for such is the definition of a legislature. There must be an external interference, not only in the collection of taxes, but in the judiciary. Was there ever such a thing in any country before? Great Britain never went so far in the stamp act. Poyning's law—the abhorrence of the Irish—never went so far. I never heard of two supreme coördinate powers in one and the same country before. I cannot conceive how it can happen. It surpasses every thing that I have read of concerning other governments, or that I can conceive by the utmost exertion of my faculties.

But, sir, as a cure for every thing, the democratic branch is elected by the people. What security is there in that? as has already been demanded. Their number is too small Is not a small number more easy to be corrupted than a large one? Were not the tribunes at Rome the choice of the people? Were not the decemviri chosen by them? Was not Caesar himself the choice of the people? Did this secure them from oppression and slavery? Did this render these agents so chosen by. the people upright? If five hundred and sixty members are corrupted in the British House of Commons, will it not be easier to corrupt ninety-one members of the new Constitution? But the British House of Commons are corrupted from the same cause that our representatives will be: I mean, from the Old Sarums among them—from the inequality of the representation. How many are legislating in this country yearly? It is thought necessary to have fifteen hundred representatives, for the great purposes of legislation, throughout the Union, exclusive of one hundred and sixty senators, which form a proportion of about one for every fifteen hundred persons By the present Constitution, these extensive powers are to be exercised by the small number of ninety-one persons—a proportion almost twenty times less than the other. It must be degrading indeed to think that so small a number should be equal to so many! Such a preferential distinction must presuppose the happiest selection. They must have some thing divine in their composition, to merit such a preeminence But my greatest objection is, that it will, in its operation, be found unequal, grievous, and oppressive. If it have any
vol. iii.36