Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v3.djvu/406

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390
DEBATES.
[Nicholas.

will render a less numerous army sufficient. By these means, there will be a sufficient defence for the country, without having a standing army altogether, or oppressing the people. The worthy member has said, that it ought to be a part of the Constitution that the militia ought not to go out of the state without the consent of the state legislature. What would be the consequence of this? The general defence is trusted to the general government. How is it to protect the Union? It must apply to the state governments before it can do it. Is this right? Is it not subjecting the general will to the particular will, and exposing the general defence to the particular caprice of the members of the state governments? This would entirely defeat the power given to Congress to provide for the general defence; and unless the militia were to aid in the execution of the laws when resisted, the other powers of Congress would be nugatory. But he has said that this idea is Justified by the English history; for that the king has the power of the sword, but must apply to the commons for the means of using it—for the purse. This is not a similar case. The king and commons are parts of the same government. But the general government is separate and perfectly distinct from the individual governments of the states. Should Congress be obliged to apply to the particular states for the militia, they may be refused, and the government overturned. To make the case similar, he ought to show us that the king and Parliament were obliged to call on some other power to raise forces, and provide for the means of carrying on war; for, otherwise, there is no similitude.

If the general government be obliged to apply to the states, a part will be thereby rendered superior to the whole. What are to be the effects of the amendments proposed? To destroy one of the most beneficial parts of the Constitution, put an obstacle in the way of the general government, and put it in the power of the state governments to take away the aid of the militia. Who will be most likely to want the aid of the militia? The Southern States, from their situation. Who are the most likely to be called for? The Eastern States, from their strength, &c. Should we put it in the power of particular states to refuse the militia, it ought to operate against ourselves. It is the height of bad policy to alter this part of the system. But it is said, the