Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v5.djvu/102

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76
DEBATES.
[March,

Wednesday, March 26.

Communication was made, through the secretary of foreign affairs, by the minister of France, as to the late negotiation, from letters received by him from the Count de Vergennes, dated in December last, and brought by the packet Washington. This communication showed, though delicately, that France was displeased with our ministers for signing the preliminary articles separately; that she had labored, by recommending mutual concessions, to compromise disputes between Spain and the United States, and that she was apprehensive that Great Britain would hereafter, as they already had endeavored to, sow discords between them. It signified that the "intimacy between our ministers and those of Great Britain" furnished a handle for this purpose.

Besides the public communication to Congress, other parts of letters from the Count de Vergennes were privately communicated to the president of Congress and to sundry members, expressing more particularly the dissatisfaction of the court of France at the conduct of our ministers, and urging the necessity of establishing permanent revenues for paying our debts and supporting a national character. The substance of these private communications, as taken on the 23d instant, by the president, is as follows:—

FINANCE.

"That the Count de Vergennes was alarmed at the extravagant demands of Dr. Franklin in behalf of the United States; that he was surprised, at the same time, that the inhabitants paid so little attention to doing something for themselves. If they could not be brought to give adequate funds for their defence during a dangerous war, it was not likely that so desirable an end could be accomplished when their fears were allayed by a general peace; that this reasoning affected the credit of the United States, and no one could be found who would risk their money under such circumstances; that the king would be glad to know what funds were provided for the security and payment of the ten millions borrowed by him in Holland; that the Count de Vergennes hardly dared to report in favor of the United States to the king and council, as money was so scarce that it would be with the greatest difficulty that even a email part of the requisition could be complied with. The causes of this scarcity were a five years' war, which had increased the expenses of government to an enormous amount—the exportation of large sums of specie to America for the support and pay of both Trench and English armies—the loans to America—the stoppage of bullion in South America, which prevented its flowing in the usual channels."[1]

A letter of a later date added,—

"That he had received the chevalier's letter of October, and rejoiced to find that Congress had provided funds for their debts, which gave him great encouragement, and he had prevailed On the comptroller-general to join him in a report to his majesty and council for six millions of livres for the United States to support the war; but assures the Chevalier de Luzerne that be must never again consent to a further application."

NEGOTIATIONS.

"He complains of being treated with great indelicacy by the American commissioners, they having signed the treaty without any confidential communication: that had France treated America with the same indelicacy, she might have signed the treaty first, as every thing between France and England was settled, but the king chose to keep faith with his allies, and, therefore, always refused to do any thing definitively till all his allies were ready; that this conduct had delayed the definitive treaty, England having considered herself as greatly strengthened by America; that Dr. Franklin waite3 on the Count de Vergennes, and acknowledged the indelicacy of their behavior, and had prevailed on him to bury it in oblivion; that the English were endeavoring all in their power to sow seeds of discord between our commissioners and the court of Spain, representing our claims to the westward as extravagant and inadmissible; that

it became Congress to be attentive to this business, and to prevent the ill effects that it might be attended with; that the king had informed the court of Spain, that ho heartily wished that the United States might enjoy a cordial coalition with his Catholic Majesty, yet he should leave the whole affair entirely to the two states, and not interfere otherwise than as by his counsel and advice, when asked; that, although the United States had not been so well treated by Spain as might have been expected, yet that his majesty wished that America might reap the advantage of a beneficial treaty with Spain; that as the peace was not yet certain, it became all the powers at war to be ready for a vigorous campaign, and hoped Congress would exert themselves to aid the common cause by some offensive operations against the enemy; but if the British should evacuate the United States, the king earnestly hoped Congress would take the most decided measures to prevent any intercourse with the British, and particularly in the way of merchandise or supplying them with provisions, which would prove of the most dangerous tendency

  1. Another cause mentioned was the large balance of specie in favor of the northern powers during the war.