legislature, as it was presumable that the counties having the power in the former case would secure it to themselves in the latter. What danger could there be in giving a controlling power to the national legislature? Of whom was it to consist? First, of a Senate to be chosen by the state legislatures. If the latter, therefore, could be trusted, their representatives could not be dangerous. Secondly, of representatives elected by the same people who elect the state legislatures. Surely, then, if confidence is due to the latter, it must be due to the former. It seems as improper in principle, though it might be less inconvenient in practice, to give to the slate legislatures this great authority over the election of the representatives of the people in the general legislature, as it would be to give to the latter a like power over the election of their representatives in the state legislatures.
Mr. KING. If this power be not given to the national legislature, their right of judging of the returns of their members may be frustrated. No probability has been suggested of its being abused by them. Although this scheme of erecting the general government on the authority of the state legislatures has been fatal to the federal establishment, it would seem as if many gentlemen still foster the dangerous idea.
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS observed, that the states might make false returns, and then make no provisions for new elections.
Mr. SHERMAN did not know but it might be best to retain the clause, though he had himself sufficient confidence in the state legislatures.
The motion of Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Rutledge did not prevail.
The word "respectively" was inserted after the word "state."
On the motion of Mr. READ, the word "their" was struck out, and "regulations in such cases," inserted, in place of "provisions concerning them,"—the clause then reading, "but regulations, in each of the foregoing cases, may, at any time, be made or altered by the legislature of the United States." This was meant to give the national legislature a power not only to alter the provisions of the states, but to make regulations, in case the stales should fail or refuse altogether. Article 6, sect. I, as thus amended, was agreed to, nem. con.199
Adjourned.
In Convention.—Article 6, sect. 2, was taken up.
Mr. PINCKNEY. The committee, as he had conceived, were instructed to report the proper qualifications of property for the members of the national legislature; instead of which they have referred the task to the national legislature itself. Should it be left on this tooting, the first legislature will meet without any particular qualifications of property; and, if it should happen to consist of rich men, they might fix such qualifications as may be too favorable to the rich; if of poor men, an opposite extreme might be run into. He was opposed to the establishment of an undue aristocratic influence in the
