The Assistant Attorney General has advised me that there is no precedent for an assertion of executive privilege by a former President against an incumbent President to prevent the latter from obtaining from NARA Presidential records belonging to the Federal Government where "such records contain information that is needed for the conduct of current business of the incumbent President's office and that is not otherwise available." 44 U.S.C. § 2205(2)(B).
To the contrary, the Supreme Court's decision in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), strongly suggests that a former President may not successfully assert executive privilege "against the very Executive Branch in whose name the privilege is invoked." Id. at 447-48. In Nixon v. GSA, the Court rejected former President Nixon's argument that a statute requiring that Presidential records from his term in office be maintained in the custody of, and screened by, NARA's predecessor agency—a "very limited intrusion by personnel in the Executive Branch sensitive to executive concerns"—would "impermissibly interfere with candid communication of views by Presidential advisers." Id. at 451; see also id. at 455 (rejecting the claim). The Court specifically noted that an "incumbent President should not be dependent on happenstance or the whim of a prior President when he seeks access to records of past decisions that define or channel current governmental obligations." Id. at 452; see also id. at 441-46 (emphasizing, in the course of rejecting a separation-of-powers challenge to a provision of a federal statute governing the disposition of former President Nixon's tape recordings, papers, and. other historical materials "within the Executive Branch," where the "employees of that branch [would] have access to the materials only 'for lawful Government use,'" that "[t]he Executive Branch remains in full control of the Presidential materials, and the Act facially is designed to ensure that the materials can be released only when release is not barred by some applicable privilege inherent in that branch"; and concluding that "nothing contained in the Act renders it unduly disruptive of the Executive Branch")
It is not necessary that I decide whether there might be any circumstances in which a former President could successfully assert a claim of executive privilege to prevent an Executive Branch agency from having access to Presidential records for the performance of valid executive functions. The question in this case is not a close one. The Executive Branch here is seeking access to records belonging to, and in the custody of, the Federal Government itself, not only in order to investigate whether those records were handled in an unlawful manner but also, as the National Security Division explained, to "conduct an assessment of the potential damage resulting from the apparent manner in which these materials were stored and transported and take any necessary remedial steps." These reviews will be conducted by current government personnel who, like the archival officials in Nixon v. GSA, are "sensitive to executive concerns." Id. at 451. And on the other side of the balance, there is no reason to believe such reviews could "adversely affect the ability of future Presidents to obtain the candid advice necessary for effective decisionmaking." Id. at 450. To the contrary: Ensuring that classified information is appropriately protected, and taking any necessary remedial action if it was not, are steps essential to preserving the ability of future Presidents to "receive the full and frank submissions of facts and opinions upon which effective discharge of [their] duties depends." Id. at 449.
Because an assertion of executive privilege against the incumbent President under these circumstances would not be viable, it follows that there is no basis for the former President to make a "protective assertion of executive privilege," which the Assistant Attorney General
