on the Union side died soon after, and the same was the case with the Confederates. The Union army lost 20 generals, 16 wounded, and four killed. The Confederates lost 17 generals, 13 wounded, three killed, and one captured.
After its defeat at Gettysburg, the Confederate army retreated to Northern Virginia, closely followed by the Union forces. During the remainder of 1863 there were no important movements on either side.
A contrary result to the battle of Gettysburg would have been fraught with disaster to the Union cause, far beyond the loss of men and material during the clash of arms. It would have uncovered Baltimore and Philadelphia to the advance of the Confederate army, and enabled Lee to establish himself in the rich region of Eastern Pennsylvania, whence he could gather abundant supplies for his army, while it rested from the fatigue of the long march, and repaired the ravages of battle. Washington would have been endangered, and it was Lee's plan to give a crushing defeat to the Union army, and then occupy the capital and dictate terms of peace. He was well aware of the discontent that prevailed at the North, and the opposition that politicians and others were making to the prosecution of the war for the suppression of the rebellion. He counted confidently upon an uprising in the North, in case he could carry the war into its territory instead of confining it, as it had been thus far and was ever after confined, to the Southern States. Between the opposition influences and the fears of the people, he hoped to create a sentiment in favor of peace, and with his advantage of position he believed he would be able, in a great measure, to dictate its terms.
His confidence cannot be wondered at when it is remembered that he had, not long before, defeated the Union army of Virginia, at Chancellorsville, and, previous to Chancellorsville, had inflicted other defeats of equal
