ing the stores at that point and disabling the railway, the right wing (McPherson's corps) would march westward to join the rest of the army for moving on Vicksburg.
Four days were occupied in carrying out these movements; but unforeseen circumstances caused a change of plan. On the 12th of May, when approaching Raymond, McPherson's corps encountered two Confederate brigades, which were defeated after a fight of two hours. They retreated on Jackson, and were followed by McPherson, who was confident of capturing the place without much difficulty, when news came during the night that Johnston was momentarily expected in Jackson to take command in person, and that troops were being concentrated there with a view to strengthening Vicksburg. General Grant immediately ordered the left and centre of the army to march on Jackson, where it would join the right wing, and be able to cope with whatever force might be assembled there. Pemberton was at Edwards Station, on the Vicksburg and Jackson Railway, and waiting to deliver battle on the appearance of the enemy. But the latter turned eastward before the railway was reached.
Johnston arrived at Jackson on the night of the 13th, and immediately perceived the danger of the situation, with the Union army between himself and Pemberton. He immediately sent orders for the latter to move east to Clinton, and attack the rear of the Union army, while he engaged it in front. Pemberton had 17,000 men at Edwards Station, while Johnston had some 10,000 or 12,000 in Jackson. If these had co-operated there was a possibility of defeating the Union army, though hardly a probability. But without co-operation there was no hope of success. Pemberton did not move as ordered, and when McPherson's and the 15th corps reached Jackson on the 14th, all that Johnston could do was to engage in a sort of rear guard fight for two hours or so, while he removed the stores, or as much of them as possible, along
