not supported, and the result was the Confederates were compelled to retire after heavy losses in killed and wounded, and nearly 2,000 prisoners.
The Union forces were not withdrawn from the Cox road as Lee had expected, and consequently he could not carry out his plan of escaping by that route. Realizing that Lee must have withdrawn men from other parts of his lines in order to attack Fort Steadman, Gen. Meade ordered an advance of the 6th and 2d corps, who were in position to the left of Fort Steadman. He found what he had expected, and the Union troops took possession of the Confederate picket line and permanently held it. Thus Lee's movement, which was intended to cut the Union army in two by the occupation of Fort Steadman and the works behind it, and thus afford him an opportunity to escape, was not only a failure, but resulted in his loss of important points.
This affair did not in the least interfere with Grant's plans, which were for a general movement on the 29th March. He proposed to swing a portion of his army around "by the left," and enable it to turn completely the Confederate right. By the success of this movement Lee would be effectually cut off from escape to the southward.
Three divisions of the Army of the James, which had long been lying in front of Richmond, were brought around to the left of the Union lines facing Petersburg. As soon as they were in position the 5th corps (Warren's) and the 2d corps (Humphreys') were ordered to the southwestward till they had crossed Hatcher's Run; then they faced northward and advanced till they could feel the Confederate right. On the extreme left was Sheridan with 10,000 cavalry, acting under orders direct from General Grant. Warren's corps had a slight encounter with the enemy, in which about 400 men were killed and wounded on the Union side; the Confederates lost about the same in casualties, with the addition of 100 prisoners.
