in their leisurely march upon Lima, the soldiers committing the excesses usually attributable to an advancing army in an enemy's country. The Chilians remained three weeks in the Lurin valley, the time being spent in collecting provisions, getting every thing in readiness for the advance, maturing plans for the capture of Lima, and ascertaining as fully as possible the strength and position of the Peruvians.
From the upper part of the Lurin valley there is a road following the foot of the mountains, and crossing a strip of desert to Até, a little village in a corner of the valley in which Lima is situated. The Chilian commander sent a reconnoitring expedition as far as Até, to ascertain the state of the defences in that region; as this road passed around the extreme left of the Peruvian line, it was contemplated to turn completely the Peruvian position by marching around to Até and reaching Lima by the rear. After careful deliberation the plan was rejected, as there is not a drop of water for fifteen miles over the desert; the debouch into the plain in face of an enemy would have been difficult, and the inland route would prevent all co-operation by the fleet. A direct attack was decided upon.
The 1st Chilian division under General Lynch formed the left wing of the attacking army. It was to assault the line of defence between Morro Solar and Santa Teresa, and then push against Chorillos, which lies on the coast about half-way between the two lines of defence. The 2d division under General Sotomayor was to break the line in front of San Juan, and then co-operate with Lynch against Chorillos. The 3d division, commanded by Colonel Lagos, was on the extreme right; it was to hold the Peruvian left in check, or support the centre as cirumstances might require, and the reserve, under Colonel Martinez, was in the space between the left and centre, ready to move in whatever direction it was ordered.
The Peruvian commander-in-chief had his head-quarters
