CH?.P. XI.] PBN?CB---SATmrACTZON. 357 and the crushing of the J?_n_senists. He quotes father Bauny and Ba- sil Pontius,* who speak as follows: "An opinion is cpJled ,?.'obable when it is founded upon reasons of some importance. Hence it some- times happens that only one very grave doctor can render an opinion probable; for a man who is particularly devoted to study would not adopt an opinion unless he were induced by a good and sufficient rea- son." Sanchez, one of their most celebrated casuists, says:? "You may perhaps doubt whether the authority of a single good and learned doctor be su?cient to render an opin/on probable. I answer, It is; and Angelus, Sylvius, Navarre, Emanuel Sa, &c., assert the same, ftwnishing this proof:--A probable opinion is that which has a consi- derable foundation, but the authority of a wise and pious man is not of small but of great importance; for--and pray listen to this reason--if the testimony of such a man possess sufficient weight to conv/nce us that any occurrence took place, for example, at Rome, why shoidd it not be equally satisfactory in deciding a doubtful point of morality 7 And I disapprove of the limitation prescribed by certain writers, that the authority of such a doctor is sufficient in quest/OhS relating to hu- man affairs, but not in those which refer to religious concerns; for it /s of the greatest importance in both." "And though the opinion of doctors may be different, this is nothing aga/nst the doctrine of probabil/ty, as every one may render his own opinion probable. In fact, they scarcely ever agree; for very few questions can arise in which one will not say yes, and another ?o; and yet each of these contrary opinions is F?'o?le, as Diana states on a certain subject:5 ' Pontius and Sanchez are of an opposite opinion; but inasmuch as they are both learned men, each one makes his own sen- timent probable.' In such cases each is to prefer the opinion which is most agreeable to himself, though what he rejects may be the most /?'?a? and ? opinions, as Emanuel Sa declares:�A person may do what he conceives to be perfffitted by one probable opinion, although the i:ontrary be more sure; but the opinion of one grave doe- tor is sufficient.' But suppose an opinion be /e?s tn'oba?l? and /ess ?ure; it may be probable by rejecting that which is more p,'o/?/? and more sub'e, according to the great Jesuit Ffiiutius,�o says: ' It is allowable to follow the opinion which is less probable, though it be also less sure. This is trio concurrent sentiment of modern authors.' Answers are given by Jesuits to please those who consult them. The words of Laiman, which the twenty-four elders have followed, are: ' When a doctor is consulted, he may give his advice not only as Fro- bah/e, according to his opinion, but contrary to his opinion, if it should be deemed p,'oba? by others, when advice which is opposed to our own is more favourable and agreeable to those who consult him; s/ forte et illi favorabilior sou exoptatior sit: but I say farther, that ho will not act without reason if he should give those who consult him an opi- nion held probable by some learned individual, though he felt confident at the same time it was absolutely false." Such are the abominable sentiments of the Jesuits; and as their order has been restored by the popes, their opin/ons, or rather doctr/?# and 9M?'a/fu/e?, have been restored with them. Not that all Roman
- In Priucip., ox. 8, n. 8. ? Sore.,!. i, c. 9, n.?. ? P?rt 8, tam. 4, v. 244.
4, Aplmmm. �Dubb, p. 18?. 4, Mm'. quinsy, tr. 21, c. 4, n. 1?. l ,Goocle
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