Page:Democracy in America (Reeve).djvu/445

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WHAT ARE THE CHANCES IN FAVOUR OF THE DURATION OF THE AMERICAN UNION, AND WHAT DANGERS THREATEN IT.

Reasons why the preponderating Force lies in the States rather than in the Union.—The Union will only last as long as all the States choose to belong to it.—Causes which tend to keep them united.—Utility of the Union to resist foreign Enemies, and to prevent the Existence of Foreigners in America.—No natural Barriers between the several States.—No conflicting Interests to divide them.—Reciprocal Interests of the Northern, Southern, and Western States.—Intellectual ties of Union—Uniformity of Opinions.—Dangers of the Union resulting from the different Characters and the Passions of its Citizens.—Character of the Citizens in the South and in the North.—The rapid growth of the Union one of its greatest Dangers.—Progress of the Population to the Northwest.—Power gravitates in the same Direction.—Passions originating from sudden turns of Fortune.—Whether the existing Government of the Union tends to gain strength, or to lose it.—Various sign of its Decrease.—Internal Improvement.—Waste Lands.—Indians.—The Bank.—The Tariff.—General Jackson.

The maintenance of the existing institutions of the several states depends in some measure upon the maintenance of the Union itself. It is therefore important in the first instance to inquire into the probable fate of the Union. One point may indeed be assumed at once; if the present confederation were dissolved, it appears to me to be incontestable that the states of which it is now composed would not return to their original isolated condition; but that several Unions would then be formed in the place of one. It is not my intention to inquire into the principles upon which these new Unions would probably be established, but merely to show what the causes are which may effect the dismemberment of the existing confederation.

With this object I shall be obliged to retrace some of the steps which I have already taken, and to revert to topics which I have before discussed. I am aware that the reader may accuse me of repetition, but the importance of the matter which still remains to be treated is my excuse; I had rather say too much, than say too little to be thoroughly understood, and I prefer injuring the author to slighting the subject.

The legislators who formed the constitution of 1789, endeavoured to confer a distinct and preponderating authority upon the federal power. But they were confined by the conditions of the task which they had undertaken to perform. They were not appointed