Connecticut, since 2000. The only exceptions were 7 miles of track located in or adjacent to terminals where trains move slower and automatic train control systems are in service. (For more information on PTC, see section 1.5.1.)
Most of the national network of track that Amtrak operates over is owned by other railroads. In fact, 72 percent of the miles traveled by Amtrak trains is on tracks owned by "host railroads." Host railroads are responsible for PTC installation on their property where passenger trains operate or where poison or toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials are transported.[1] Amtrak has installed PTC on its locomotives that operate over host railroads.[2]
At the time of the accident, Amtrak trains operating through this territory were authorized by wayside and interlocking signals, as well as cab signals.[3] The signals that authorized the train movements were part of a traffic control system controlled from a dispatching center in Wilmington. All four main tracks were part of the traffic control system, and trains were authorized by signals to operate in both directions. Employees were provided with operating procedures that were part of the Northeast Operating Rules Advisory Committee (NORAC) Operating Rules. Amtrak timetable 5 (effective November 11, 2012) also governed train movements included train speeds at specific locations.
1.4 Analysis of the Engineer's Actions
The Amtrak engineer told investigators he could not remember what happened immediately preceding the derailment.[4] Specifically, he could not explain why he increased the train's speed to 106 mph as he approached and entered the curve at Frankford Junction where the maximum authorized speed was 50 mph. His last memory until the time of the accident was at the end of the radio conversation (about 9:19 p.m.) between the disabled SEPTA train engineer and the dispatcher as he negotiated the right-hand curve preceding the derailment. Amtrak records showed the engineer was experienced, certified, and qualified, and he had no previous disciplinary action. He had worked on the Northeast Corridor since 2013 and had traveled through the curve at Frankford Junction hundreds of times.
The engineer maintained a regular work and rest schedule for several days leading up to the accident, and there was no evidence that he suffered from fatigue. There was no evidence of any medical condition that would have impeded his job performance, and postaccident tests showed no evidence that he was impaired during the accident trip by alcohol, other drugs, or any substance The train 188 conductor and assistant conductors described the engineer in positive terms, including saying that he was a "good engineer" who did "what he was supposed to do."
The engineer's cell phone and records from his cell phone provider showed it was not used during the trip. Specifically, there was no record of any calls, texts, instant messages, or
- ↑ See 49 United States Code (USC) 20157(a) and Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 171.
- ↑ The preceding information in this section was obtained from Amtrak's website, www.amtrak.com.
- ↑ For more information on cab signals see section 1.5.
- ↑ As further discussed in section 1.7, the engineer sustained a concussion in the accident, and medical records noted he had some amnesia.
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