CAESAR. The victoiies of the preceding year had deter- mined the fate of Gaul ; but many states still re- mained in arms, and entered into fresh conspiracies during the winter. The next year, B.C. 51, Cae- sar's eighth campaign in Gaul, was occupied in the reduction of these sUites, into the particulars of which we need not enter. It is sufficient to say, that he conquered in succession the Caniutes, the Bellovaci, and the Armoric states in western Gaul, took Uxellodunum, a town of the Cadurci (Cahors), and closed the campaign by the reduction of AquiUmia. He then led his troops into winter- quarters, and passed the winter at Nemetocenna in Belgium. He here employed liimself in the pacifi- cation of Gaul; and, as he already saw that his presence would soon be necessary in Italy, he was anxious to remove all causes for future wars. He accordingly imposed no new taxes, treated the stiites with honour and respect, and bestowed great presents upon the chiefs. The experience of the last two yejirs had taught the Gauls that they had no hope of contending successfully against Caesar ; and as he now treated them with mildness, they were the more readily induced to submit patiently to the Roman yoke. Having thus completed the pacification of Gaul, Caesar found that he could leave his army in the spring of B. c. 50, and there- fore, contrary to his usual practice, repaired at the Olid of the winter to Cisalpine Gaul. While Caesar had thus been actively engaged in Gaul during the last two years, affairs at Rome had taken a turn, which threatened a speedy rup- ture between him and Pompey. The death of Ci-assus in the Parthian war in b. c. 53 had left Caesar and Pompey alone at the head of the state. Pompey had been the chief instrument in raising Caesar to power in order to serve his own ends, and never seems to have supposed it possible tliat the conqueror of Mithridates could be thrown into the shade by any man in the world. This, however, now began to be the case ; Caesar's bril- liant victories in Gaul were in every body's mouth ; and Pompey saw with ill-disguised mortification that he was becoming the second person in the state. Though this did not lead him to break with Caesar at once, it made him anxious to increase his power and influence, and he had therefore resolved as early as B. c. 53 to obtain, if possible, the dictatorship. He ac- cordingly used no effort to put an end to the dis- turbances at Rome between Milo and Clodius in that year, in hopes that all parties would be willing to accede to his wishes in order to restore peace to the city. These disturbances broke out into perfect juiarchy on the death of Clodius at the beginning of the following year, b. c. 52, and led to the appointment of Pompey as sole consul with the concurrence of the senate. This, it is true, did not entirely meet Pompey's wishes, yet it was the first step which the aristocracy had taken to gratify Pompey, and it paved the way for a recon- ciliation with them. The acts of Pompey's consul- ship, which were all directed to the increase of his power, belong to Pompey's life ; it is sufficient to mention here, that among other things he ob- tained the prolongation of his government in Spain for five years more ; and as he was not yet pre- pared to break entirely with Cafjsar, he allowed some of the tribunes to carry a law exempting Caesar from the necessity of coming to Rome to become a candidate for the consulship. The ten CAESAR. 549 years of Caesar's government would expire at the end of B. c. 49, and he was therefore resolved to obtain the consulship for B. c. 48, for otherwise he would become a private man. In the following year, b. c. 51, Pompey entered into still closer connexions with the aristocracy, but at the same time was not willing to support all the violent measures of the consul M. Claudius Marcellus, who proposed to send a successor to Cae- sar, on the plea that the war in Gaul was finished, .and to deprive him of the privilege of becoming a can- didate for the consulship in his absence. At length a decree of the senate was passed, that the consuls of the succeeding year, b. c. 50, shoiild on the first of March consult the senate respecting the disposal of the consular provinces, by which time it was hoped that Pompey would be prepared to take decisive measures against Caesar. The coji- suls for the next year, b. c, 50, L. Aemilius Paul- lus and C. Claudius Marcellus, and the powerful tribune C. Curio, were all reckoned devoted parti- zans of Pompey and the senate. Caesar, however, gained over Paullus and Curio by large bribes, and with an unsparing hand distributed immense sums of money among the leading men of Rome. Thus this year passed by without the senate coming to any decision. The great fear which Pompey and the senate entertained was, that Caesar should be elected consul while he was still at the head of his army, and it was therefore proposed in the senate by the consul C. Marcellus, that Caesar should lay down his command by the 13th of November. This it could not be expected that Caesar would do ; his proconsulate had upwards of another year to run ; and if he had come to Rome as a private man to sue for the consulship, there can be little doubt that his life would have been sacrificed. Cato had declared that he would bring Caesar to trial as soon as he laid down his command ; but the trial would have been only a mockery, for Pom.pey was in the neighbourhood of the city at the head of an army, and would have overawed the judges by his soldiery as at Milo's trial. The tribune Curio consequently interposed his veto upon the proposi- tion of Marcellus. Meantime Caesar had come into Cisalpine Gaul in the spring of B. o. 50, as .al- ready mentioned. Here he was received by the municipal towns and colonies with the gretitest marks of respect and affection ; and after remain- ing there a short time, he returned to Transal- pine Gaul and held a review of his whole .irmy, which he had so long led to victory. Anxious to diminish the number of his troops, the senate had, under pretext of a war with the Parthi.ins, ordered that Pompey and Caesar should each funiish a legion to be sent into the East. The legion which Pompey intended to devote to this service was the one he had lent to Caesar in B. c. 53, and which he now accordingly dem.inded back ; and although Caesar saw that he should thus be deprived of two legions, which would probably be employed .igainst himself, he did not think it advisable to break with the senate on this point, and felt that he w.is suffi- ciently strong to spare even two legions. He accord- ingly sent them to the senate, after bestowing libe- ral presents upon cnch soldier. Upon their arrival in Italy, they were not, as Caesar had anticipated, sent to the East, but were ordered to pass the winter at Capu.a. After this Caesar stationed his remaining eight legions in winter-qu<arters, four in Belgium and four among the Aedui, and then re-
