TARENTUM. tian territory. Meanwhile, however, he had quar- relled with his allies tlie Tarentines, so that he turned against them, took their colony of Heraoleia, and endeavoured to transfer the congress of the Greek cities from thence to a place on the river Acalandrus, in the territory of Thurii. (Strab. vi. p. 280 ; Liv. viii. 24 ; Justin, xii. 2.) Hence his death, in B.C. 226, only liberated the Tarentines from an enemy instead of depriving them of an ally. They appear from this time to have either remained tranquil or carried on the contest single-handed, till B. c. 303, when we find them again invoking foreign assistance, and, as on a former occasion, sending to Sparta for aid. This was again furnished them, and a large army of mercenaries lauded at Tarentum under Cleonymus, the uncle of the Spartan king. But though lie compelled the Messapians and Luca- nians to sue for peace, Cleonymus soon alienated the minds of his Greek allies by his arrogance and luxurious habits, and became the object of general hatred before he quitted Italy. (Diod. xx. 104.) According to Strabo, the Tarentines subsequently called in the assistance of Agathocles (Strab. vi. p. 280); but we find no mention of this elsewhere, and Diodorus tells us that he concluded an alliance with the Iap3'gians and Peucetians, which could hardly liave been done with favourable intentions towards Tarentum. (Diod. xsi. p. 490.) Not long after this the Tarentines first came into collision with a more formidable foe than their neigh- bours, the Jlessapians and Lucanians. The wars of the Romans with the Sanmites, in which the de- .seeiidants of the latter people, the Apulians and Lucanians, were from time to time involved, had rendered the name and power of Rome familiar to the Greek cities on the Tarentine gulf and coast of the Adriatic, though their arms were not carried into that part of Italy till about b. c. 283, when they rendered assistance to the Thurians against the Lucanians [Thukii]. But long before this, as f.iily as the commencement of the Second Samnite War (b. c. 326), the Tarentines are mentioned in K Ilium history as supporting the Neapolitans with I'loinises of succour, which, however, they never ^' lit ; and afterwards exciting the Lucanians to war a.ainst the Romans. (Liv. viii. 27.) Again, in r. cj. 321 we are told that they sent a haughty em- lii>sy to connnand the Sanmites and Romans to (li-^ist from ho.stilities, and threatened to declare war I'll whichever party refused to obey. (Id. ix. 14.) r.iit on this occasion also they did not put their il.rcat in execution. At a subsequent period, pro- bably about B. c. 303 (Arnold's Rome, vol. ii. p. 315), the Tarentines concluded a treaty with Rome, by which it was stipulated that no Roman ships of war should pass the Lacinian cape. (Appian, Sam- nit. 7.) It was therefore a direct breach of this treaty when, in b. c. 302, a Roman squadron of ten ships under L. Cornelius, which had been sent to the assistance of the Thurians, entered the Taren- tine gulf, and even approached within sight of the city. The Tarentines, whose hostile dispo.sition was already only half concealed, and who are .said to liave been the prime movers in organising the con- federacy against Rome which led to the Fourth Sam- nite War (Zonar. viii. 2.), immediately attacked the Roman ships, sunk four of them, and took one. After this they proceeded to attack the Thurians on ac- count of their having called in the Romans, expelled the Roman garrison, and made themselves masters of the city. (Appian, Samn. 7. § 1 ; Zonal", viii. TARENTUM. Iu97 2.) The Romans sent an embassy to Tarentum to complain of these outr.ages; but their demands being refused, and their amba.ssador treated with con- tumely, they had now no choice but to declare war upon the Tarentines, b.c. 281. (Appian, ?. c. § 2; Zonar. I. c. ; Dion Cass. Fr. 1 45.) Nevertheless, the war was at first carried on with little energy ; but meanwhile the Tarentines, following their usual policy, had invited Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, to tlieir assistance. That monarch readily accepted the over- ture, and sent over his general Jlilo to occupy the citadel of Tarentum with 3000 men, while he himself followed in the winter. (Zonar. viii. 2 ; Plut. Pyrrh. 15, 16.) It is usual to represent the Tarentines as at this period sunk in luxury and eBeminacy, so that they were unable to defend themselves, and hence com- pelled to have recourse to the assistance of Pyrrhus. But there is certainly much exaggeration in this view. They were no doubt accustomed to rely much upon the arms of mercenaries, but so were all the more wealthy cities of Greece ; and it is certain that the Tarentines themselves (apart froin their allies and mercenaries), furnished not only a considerable body of cavalry, but a large force or phalanx of heavy -armed infantry, called the Leucaspids, from their white shields, who are especially mentioned as serving under Pyrrhus at the battle of Ascidum. (Dionys. xx. Fr. Didot. 1, 5.) It is unnecessary here to repeat the history of the campaigns of that monarch. His first successes for a time saved Tarentum itself from the brunt of the war : but when he at length, after his final defeat by Curius, withdrew from Italy (b. c. 274), it was evident that the full weight of the Roman arms would fall upon Tarentum. Pyrrhus, indeed, left Milo with a gar- rison to defend the city, but the Tarentines them- selves were divided into two parties, the one of which was disposed to submit to Rome, while the other applied for assistance to Carthage. A Carthagini.an fleet was actually sent to Tarentum, but it arrived too late, for Milo had already capitulated and sur- rendered the citadel into the hands of the Roman consul Papirius, e. c. 272. (Zonar. viii. 6 ; Oros. iv. 3.) From this time Tarentum continued subject to Rome. The mhabitants were indeed left in posses- sion of their own laws and nominal independence, but the city was jealously watched; and a Roman legion seems to have been commonly stationed there. (Pol. ii. 24.) During the First Punic War the Tarentines are mentioned as furnishing ships to the Romans (Pol. i. 20): but with this exception we hear no more of it till the Second Punic War, wlien it became a military post of great importance. Hannibal was from an early jieriod desirous to make himself master of the city, which, with its excellent port, would at once have secured his comnmnications with Afi-ica. It is evident also that there was a strong Carthaginian party in the city, who shortly after the battle of Cannae, opened negotiations with Han- nibal, and renewed them upon a subsequent occasion (Liv. xxii. 61, xxiv. 13); but they were kept down by the presence of the. Roman garrison, and it was not till H. c. 212 that Nico .and Philemenus, two of the leaders of this party, found an opportunity to betray the city into his hands. (Liv. x.w. 8 — 10; Pol. viii. 26 — 33.) Even then the Roman garrison still held the citadel; and Hannibal having failed in his altein]]ts to carry this fortress by as.sault, was compelled to resort to a blockade. He cut it off on
