three years, when she was paid off at Woolwich. He was immediately appointed to the Falmouth, and commanded her in the Mediterranean for the next five years. The details of this service present no interest: nothing could be more uneventful; but it is noteworthy on that very account. The son of Lord Torrington, admiral of the fleet and first lord of the admiralty, could pretty well choose his own employment, and he chose to spend his time for the most part as senior or sole officer at Port Mahon. This may have been very pleasant, but it was not exercising him in the duties of his rank, or training him for high command. In June 1738 he was appointed to the Augusta; in April 1739 was moved into the Portland; and in the following October was transferred to the Sunderland, in which he joined Vice-admiral Haddock off Cadiz. Early in 1742 he was appointed to the Sutherland, and went in her for a summer cruise to Newfoundland, coming home again in the autumn. In 1743 he was appointed to the St. George, and commanded her in the fleet under Sir John Norris in February 1743–4. He continued in her in the spring of 1744, when Sir Charles Hardy hoisted his flag on board for the voyage to Lisbon. On 8 Aug. 1745 he was promoted to be a rear-admiral, and was immediately appointed to command in the North Sea under Admiral Vernon, then commander-in-chief in the Downs, and after his resignation under Vice-admiral Martin. During the period of this service he was, in 1746, a member of the courts-martial on Vice-admiral Lestock and on Admiral Mathews. In 1747 he went out to the Mediterranean as second in command; on 15 July he was advanced to the rank of vice-admiral of the Blue; and by the death of Vice-admiral Medley, on 5 Aug., became commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, where he continued till after the conclusion of the peace. When war again broke out in 1755, Byng was appointed to command a squadron in the Channel; in the autumn he relieved Sir Edward Hawke in the Bay of Biscay; and in the following March was promoted to be admiral of the blue, and was ordered to proceed to the Mediterranean with a small squadron intended for the defence of Minorca, which, by the concurrent testimony of every agent in those parts, was then threatened by a French armament from Toulon. The government was very slow to believe this, and was rather of opinion that the armament was destined for North America, or for some operations in the west, perhaps against Ireland. The squadron sent out with Byng was therefore by no means so large as it might easily have been made; and the admiral's instructions laid most stress on the probability of the enemy passing the Straits. They were, however, perfectly explicit on the possibility of an attack on Minorca, in the event of which he was, in so many words, ordered ‘to use all possible means in his power for its relief.’
At Gibraltar he received intelligence that the enemy had landed on Minorca, had overrun the island, and was laying siege to Fort St. Philip. This was exactly the contingency which his instructions specially and positively provided for. But the governor of Gibraltar refused to part with the troops which he was ordered to send, alleging that they could not be spared from the garrison; and Byng, who from the first had shown himself very ill satisfied with the condition and force of his squadron, accepted his refusal without protest, and sailed from Gibraltar on 8 May. On the 19th he was off Port Mahon, and sent in the frigates to see what was the position of affairs, and to communicate with the acting-governor, General Blakeney. But before they could get near enough, the French squadron came in sight, and Byng, afraid that the frigates might be cut off, hastily recalled them. The wind, however, fell light, and the two fleets did not get near each other that day, nor till the afternoon of the next, 20 May, when, the enemy having yielded the weather-gage, about two o'clock Byng made the signal to bear down, and some twenty minutes after the signal to engage. In point of numbers the two fleets were equal; but the French ships were larger, carried heavier guns and more men. A comparison of the two shows that the English flagship Ramillies, of 90 guns, threw a broadside of 842 lbs., while the French flagship Foudroyant, of 80 guns, threw a broadside of 1,000 lbs. The difference throughout was in favour of the French, but by no means so much as was afterwards said; and in point of fact, the difference, whatever it was, in no way affected the result; for the French stood entirely on the defensive. This was their great advantage; for while the English were running down to the attack from the position to windward, Byng insisted on stopping to dress his line, which was thus unduly exposed. The van, under Rear-admiral West, did, indeed, bear down as ordered, and engage at very close quarters; but the rear, under the commander-in-chief, backed their topsails, got thrown into disorder, and never came within effective gunshot. The ships in the van, thus unsupported, sustained great loss, and the whole French line, which had been lying by with their main topsails square, filled, and passing slowly
