old friendship with the emperor, combined with Lord Cowley's able diplomacy at Paris, speedily removed all traces of ill-feeling between England and France, and the recall of Persigny, who was violent and indiscreet, from the French embassy in London was a change for the better. Malmesbury was convinced that both he and the Sardinian minister Azeglio acted in Palmerston's interests, and relations with the latter became very strained when, following the advice of Lord Shaftesbury, Azeglio published in the ‘Times’ the English lawyers' opinion on the ‘Cagliari’ affair, a difficulty created by the illegal detention at Naples of a Sardinian ship on board of which were two English engineers. The foreign secretary roundly characterised the proceeding as ‘unfair’ (see the correspondence between Cavour and Azeglio published by N. de Bianchi in La Politique du Comte C. de Cavour, p. 279 et seq.), and both Azeglio and Cavour were at first convinced that Malmesbury was hostile to the Italian cause. Malmesbury promptly exacted damages and an apology from the Neapolitan government while foiling the Sardinian attempt to make the affair a casus belli, and relations with Sardinia improved to such an extent that Cavour, writing to Azeglio on 1 Dec., expressed a hope that the tories would stay in power. The war of Italian liberation was now inevitable, but as an interlude came the ‘Charles et Georges’ affair, caused by the high-handed conduct of Napoleon III on the occasion of the seizure by the Portuguese government of a French ship on the ground that she was a slaver. The English government helped to compose the dispute, and though Malmesbury was attacked in the House of Lords by Lord Wodehouse, the opposition gained little by the proceeding, and the vote of censure was withdrawn. The foreign secretary outwardly maintained what Count Vitzthum called a ‘pleasing but astonishing optimism’ about Italian affairs (St. Petersburg and London, vol. i. ch. xv.); but he recorded, as early as 16 Jan. 1859, his private opinion that war could not be avoided. Nevertheless he was unceasing in his attempts to avert it, taking his stand on the arrangements of 1815 (Official Correspondence on the Italian Question, published by Malmesbury, with an introduction, in 1859). So far from acting, as he was accused at the time, in the interests of Austria, he fully recognised the grievances of Central Italy and Sardinia (despatch to Sir J. Hudson of 18 Jan. 1859). On 13 Feb. Lord Cowley was sent on a mission to Vienna with the object of securing (1) the evacuation of the Roman states by Austria and France; (2) reforms in the administration of the same states; (3) a security for better relations between Austria and Sardinia; (4) the abrogation or modification of the Austro-Italian treaties of 1849. The Russian government promptly adopted these bases of negotiation in its proposal that a congress should be convoked for the settlement of the questions at issue, a proposal accepted by the powers. ‘A congress once assembled,’ said Malmesbury to Azeglio, ‘I become, what I have always been, a friend of Italy.’ Napoleon, however, as Malmesbury knew, was only playing with the Russian proposal in order to gain time for his military preparations, and with considerable skill foiled Malmesbury's attempts to bring about a disarmament. The foreign secretary's suggestion that Sardinia should disarm in return for a guarantee by England and France against her invasion by Austria was rejected by the emperor without ceremony, and when the British government proposed a simultaneous disarmament the emperor accepted the proposal for his own part, but declined to make any representations to Sardinia. On 19 April Austria brought matters to a crisis by sending an ultimatum to Turin, and the war began. Malmesbury did his best to localise it by strongly urging the states of Germany to remain tranquil, but gained no credit at the Tuileries by the despatch, as it was suppressed by the French foreign minister, Count Walewski (Memoirs, ii. 176). His policy as formulated on 4 May to her majesty's ministers abroad was one of strict neutrality, combined with a readiness to exercise good offices in the cause of peace.
The government was beaten on the address on 10 June 1859. Malmesbury maintained that the defeat would have been avoided if Disraeli had laid the Italian blue-book on the table. His statements on the point are, however, to be received with caution. Cobden cannot, as he says, have been one of the dozen or more members who subsequently expressed their regret at having voted against him, as Cobden had not returned from America (Morley, Cobden, ii. 226). And though Malmesbury asserts in his ‘Memoirs’ that the reason of Disraeli's conduct was that he had not read the book (p. 192), the real reason seems to have been that it was not printed, and that, as they were certain to be defeated sooner or later, Malmesbury's colleagues did not care to wait for it (Kebbel, Derby, in the ‘Statesman Series,’ p. 210). When the blue-book did appear Count Vitzthum thought that Malmesbury was not quite equal to his task (St. Petersburg and London, chap. xvi.); but it contained evidence of able and straightforward, if somewhat fidgetty, diplomacy.
