intellectual movement distinguished by such names as Bacon (1561–1629), Galileo (1564–1642), Kepler (1571–1630), Harvey (1578–1657), and Descartes (1596–1650). He mixed in the scientific circles of Paris and London. He shared in the general repudiation of scholasticism. In his so-called ‘Philosophia Prima’ he touched hastily upon first principles, but failed to recognise the significance of the ultimate problems the answer to which by Descartes founded modern philosophy. His thorough-going nominalism is his most remarkable characteristic. At the same time he was scarcely influenced by Bacon's theory of the importance of systematic induction and experiment. He conceived of a general scientific scheme of universal knowledge, deducible by geometrical methods from the motions of matter which he assumed to be the ultimate fact. The conception recalls in some respects that of Mr. Herbert Spencer. Hobbes was very ill qualified for elaborating his scheme. His self-confidence was so great and his intellect so rigid when he began Euclid that he mistook blundering for original discovery, and wasted his old age in the obstinate defence of absurdities. De Morgan, however, observes (Budget of Paradoxes, p. 67) that he was not such an ‘ignoramus’ as is sometimes supposed, and that he makes ‘acute remarks on points of principle.’ His psychology remained fragmentary, though affording abundant indications of sagacity. His short statement of the associationist theory influenced his successors. His great achievement, however, is his political philosophy, especially as given in the ‘Leviathan.’ It was the edifice under which he endeavoured afterwards to introduce the foundation of philosophy, doubtless congenial, but not the real groundwork of his doctrine. Like all the great thinkers of his time, he had been profoundly impressed by the evils caused by the sectarian animosities of the time. His remedy was the entire subordination of the ecclesiastical to the secular authority—a theory which made the religion of a state dependent upon its secular sovereign, and therefore not derivable either from churches or philosophers, and shocked equally the rationalists and the orthodox. It is disputable how far Hobbes carried his own scepticism. He ostensibly accepted the creed of the national church, but in virtue of obedience to the law. He argues from texts as confidently as a puritan, but, besides twisting them to strange uses, incidentally suggests many of the leading criticisms urged by later rationalists. In support of his absolutism he interprets the doctrine of the social compact (which had been recently expounded by Hooker and Grotius) not as a compact between the sovereign and his subjects, but as between the subjects to obey the sovereign. Virtually he argues that states have been formed as the only alternative to the state of nature, or, on his showing, to anarchy and barbarism. The supremacy and unity of the sovereign power is therefore an expression of the essential condition of civilised life. To this, though with some reserves, he subordinates even the moral law; and his characteristic theory of human selfishness reduces the only sanction to fear of force or each man's hopes of personal advantage. Hobbes loves to display his paradoxes in the most extreme form, and has the force of a sublimely one-sided thinker. The effect is increased by an admirable style, sententious and weighty, terse and lucid in the highest degree, and enlivened by shrewd strokes of wit and humour. In spite of occasional archaisms, the ‘Leviathan’ is a model of vigorous exposition, unsurpassed in the language. Among the prominent assailants not hitherto noticed of Hobbes were Clarendon in his ‘Brief View and Survey of the … Errors … in … “Leviathan”’ 1676, written by 1670; Thomas (afterwards Archbishop) Tenison in the ‘Creed of Mr. Hobbes examined,’ 1670; and John Eachard [q. v.] in two dialogues (1672 and 1673), which went through many editions. More serious philosophical criticisms came from the Cambridge Platonists. Cudworth, whose ‘Intellectual System’ is an elaborate examination of Hobbes's materialism, had already attacked Hobbes's principles in his academical thesis in 1644, and left many manuscripts, one or two of which [see under Cudworth, Ralph] have been published, directed against Hobbes's ethics and doctrine of necessity. Henry More [q. v.] criticised Hobbes's materialism in his ‘Immortality of the Soul,’ 1659. Richard Cumberland (1631–1718) [q. v.], in his ‘De Legibus Naturæ,’ 1672, attacks chiefly Hobbes's theory of selfishness. Samuel Clarke, in his two courses of Boyle lectures (1704–5), also defends immutable morality and free-will against Hobbes. His first purely political assailant was Sir Robert Filmer [q. v.] in 1652; and he is frequently mentioned by Harrington in the ‘Oceana,’ 1656, who, however, respected him, and pays him a very high compliment in the ‘Prerogative of Popular Government’ (Works, 1700, p. 259). Locke has been accused of plagiarising from Hobbes, and there are points of coincidence, although it cannot be doubted that Locke struck out his new way under the influence of Descartes, and owed little to Hobbes. Hobbes's influ-
