him to rise above calamity and, conscious of his powers, to remain undismayed by defeat. His temper was rarely ruffled, but he did not easily forgive those who offended him. While he retained through life his delight in Greek and Roman literature, and appreciated elegant English writing, he did not approach Fox either in classical scholarship or knowledge of literature generally. In office he offered no reward either to literature or art — a course which, if not matter for reproach, proved impolitic. As an orator, he spoke more correctly than Fox, expressed his meaning with less effort, and was far more master of himself. The best word always seemed to come spontaneously to his lips ; he never stormed, his speeches were lucid, and his handling of his subject always complete. His memory was good, and he seldom used notes. He excelled in sarcasm, and used it freely. While Fox persuaded his hearers, Pitt commanded their assent ; his speeches appealed to reason, and breathed the lofty sentiments of the speaker. His voice was rich, but its tone lacked modulation ; his action was vehement and ungraceful. His judgment in party matters was admirable, and was conspicuously shown in his refusal of office in 1782, in his use of Fox's mistakes, and his conduct of affairs in 1784 and 1788-1789, and in his readiness to withdraw taxes that were generally obnoxious. Constantly needing the help of men of the higher classes, he paid for it with honours that cost the country nothing. He thus almost doubled the number of the House of Lords, and destroyed the whig oligarchy which, during the earlier years of the reign, had become intolerable (Rosebery, pp. 275-7). He showed remarkable foresight in declaring, during his last days, that a national war beginning in Spain might even then save Europe (ib. p. 256) ; but in one or two notable instances, such as his belief that the war with France would be short, his prescience was at fault. He made some serious political mistakes. A sanguine tendency to resort, in the face of difficulties, to a policy of vagueness, probably accounts for the Fitzwilliam imbroglio, and is to be discovered in his hopes about Fox in 1804, and his promises to Sidmouth. He acted unwisely in not speaking earlier to the king about his intention respecting catholic emancipation ; and his pledge to abandon the question during the king's lifetime , though well-intentioned, is not to be defended. At times his conduct was inconsistent. His attitude towards Addington's ministry, though dictated by a sense of honour, was inspired by no intelligible principle. He honestly strove in 1804 to persuade the king to consent to a comprehensive government ; but he allowed the king's wishes to outweigh his judgment in a matter which clearly involved the country's best interests.
As a peace minister Pitt aimed at extending the franchise and purifying elections. Supported by the crown, and yet acting independently, he destroyed the whig oligarchy, and pursued in every direction a policy large and statesmanlike. He strengthened public, credit by creating a surplus, established an enlightened system of finance, and brought order into the administration of the revenue. In 1783 the three-per-cents were at 74 ; in 1792 they were over 96 (Newmarch). The success of his commercial policy, which is illustrated by his reduction of customs duties, by his proposals for Ireland, and by his treaty with France, may be estimated by the vast increase in British commerce between the same dates (Rosebery, p. 280). He enabled the country to reap the full benefit of the extension of manufactures consequent on the introduction of machinery. Peace was necessary for the fulfilment of his work ; war forced him to abandon domestic reforms and to direct his energies as a domestic minister towards stringently exacting from the people, in face of a relentless foe, the fullest adherence to the existing constitution.
As a war minister he has been compared unfavourably with his father. Chatham, however, had not to deal with Bonaparte ; his son had no such ally as Frederick the Great. Pitt recognised that England should not engage in a war on land. The war on the continent had to be carried on by the continental powers, and Pitt, by means of his coalitions, strained every nerve to array them against France. The European sovereigns would not stir in the common cause without money, and he had to find it. From 1793 to 1801 8,836,000l. was spent in subsidies. This and other expenses of the war he met largely by loans, increasing the public liabilities during the period by 334,525,436l., though from this must be deducted the large amount of debt redeemed by the sinking fund (ib. pp. 150-1). He was forced to borrow at high rates of interest, which made the difference between the money he received and the capital he created 103,000,000l., but he was unwilling to check commercial development by excessive taxation, and his loans employed capital that could not in any case have been used in trade. Pitt's coalitions failed of their purpose, but it was not his fault that the sovereigns of Europe were jealous, selfish, and short-sighted.
He held that it was the part of Great Britain to check French aggrandisement by
