that Turkey must accept it without amendment (Earl Russell's Recollections, p. 271). At any rate, the Porte's alterations led to the failure of the note. In September, on the representations of the French government, Clarendon ordered the advance of the allied fleets to Constantinople, though Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had neither desired nor reported on it. Though no action was taken, the matter became known, and was peculiarly provocative to Russia. From the time of the attack on the Turkish fleet at Sinope Clarendon considered war inevitable, and in February 1854 he despatched a summons to the czar to evacuate the principalities. Somewhat precipitately, however, he allowed it to be delivered before Austria, the power most gravely concerned, had definitely undertaken to join, if necessary, in war. On the other hand, his unwearied patience and temper and his personal influence with Napoleon were invaluable in maintaining co-operation between the allies. In March 1855 he visited the emperor at the camp at Boulogne, and succeeded in dissuading him from assuming command in the Crimea in person. The peace of Paris, which he negotiated on behalf of Great Britain, was generally considered to be the best settlement obtainable under the circumstances, though Lord Derby denounced it as ‘The Capitulation of Paris.’ It was at his instance that the conference assembled at Paris in order that personal reference to the emperor might be made when necessary, and, though very reluctantly—for he saw how gravely he might imperil his reputation—he suggested that the British representative ought to be himself. He felt much dissatisfied with the necessity under which the French government's desire to end the war on any terms had placed him of accepting peace before a victorious campaign had thoroughly broken the power of Russia (see letter to Lord Stratford, Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, ii. 434); but he considered that the harder terms which a prolongation of the war by England alone might have enabled her to impose would not be worth the bloodshed and outlay which further hostilities would involve. He went to Paris on 17 Feb. 1856, and remained till peace was signed on 30 March. The British ministry left his hands free. Against the emperor, whose chief desire was to win personal credit by a ‘generous’ treatment of Russia, he held out, not without great difficulty, for the imposition of substantial sacrifices, especially in the surrender of part of Bessarabia. On the other hand, he preferred by frank and disinterested dealing to satisfy the Austrian and Turkish governments that England was their most trustworthy friend in Europe, and so to secure a powerful influence on the continent, rather than to hold out for individual advantages among the terms of peace. The declaration appended to the treaty respecting belligerent rights was especially his work, and was at the time thought to be a signal gain for Great Britain and a lasting service to the cause of peace. It is, however, now much doubted whether the renunciation of the right of seizure of neutral goods in hostile bottoms was not really the surrender of a weapon of defence with which the chief maritime and commercial power can ill afford to dispense.
Clarendon's personal weight and importance were signally shown during the ministerial crisis of January and February 1855. Lord Derby, when commissioned by the queen to form a ministry in succession to Lord Aberdeen's, applied to Lord Palmerston, who at first consented to join him, and to Clarendon, who refused. Palmerston then withdrew, and Lord Derby gave up the attempt. Lord John Russell, when summoned by the queen, considered the presence of Clarendon at the foreign office indispensable. Clarendon, however, thought Russell had not sufficient popular support to enable him to form a lasting administration, and refused to join. Queen Victoria then asked him to advise her what to do, and he urged that Palmerston alone could form a ministry. Palmerston was sent for and accepted the commission; he obtained Clarendon's adhesion, and the ministry was formed (Life of Prince Consort, iii. 207; Greville Memoirs, 3rd ser. ii. 64; Memoirs of an ex-Minister, ii. 6). By personal influence, both with the queen and with Palmerston, he did much to create a complete confidence between her and the prime minister, instead of the feeling of irritation and distrust which had prevailed in 1851 and 1852, and his own relations to the premier, which had been hostile down to 1850, were now of the most friendly kind.
Clarendon continued at the foreign office till the second Derby administration was formed in 1858. His attitude towards Brazil in 1856 was considered unfairly dictatorial and Palmerstonian. When the liberals returned to office in June 1859 Lord John Russell claimed to be foreign secretary, perhaps for the express purpose of excluding Clarendon. The latter waived his claims, but refused Palmerston's offer of his choice of other offices, nor did he consent to yield even to the queen's persuasion. He was selected in October 1861 to represent the queen at the coronation of the king of
