a vice-admiral. On the return of the Boyne to England in November 1699 the ship was ordered to pay off, and Walker asked for leave of absence to go to Ireland, where, he explained, he had a cause pending in the court of chancery, in which his interests were involved to the extent of a thousand pounds. As the admiralty refused him leave till the ship was safe in Hamoaze and her powder discharged, he begged to ‘lay down’ the command.
In December 1701 he was appointed to the Burford, one of the fleet off Cadiz under Sir George Rooke [q. v.] in 1702; and afterwards of a squadron detached to the West Indies with Walker as commodore (Burchett, pp. 599, 603). After calling at the Cape Verd Islands and at Barbados, he arrived at Antigua in the middle of February, and was desired by Colonel Christopher Codrington [q. v.] to co-operate in an attack on Guadeloupe. The first part of the co-operation was to provide the land forces with ammunition, which was done by making up cartridges with large-grained cannon powder and bullets taken from the case-shot. Of flints there was no store, nor yet of mortars, bombs, pickaxes, spades, and such like, necessary for a siege. With officers who had allowed their troops to be in this state of destitution, it was scarcely likely that a warm-tempered man such as Walker could act cordially; and it is very possible that this want of agreement was in a measure answerable for the failure, though the account of the campaign seems to attribute it mainly to the inefficiency of the land forces. The ships certainly took the men over to Guadeloupe, put them safely on shore, cleared the enemy out of such batteries as were within reach of the sea, and kept open the communications. When the French, driven out of the towns and forts, were permitted to retire to the mountains, the English were incapable of pursuing them, and finally withdrew after destroying the town, forts, and plantations. ‘Never did any troops enterprise a thing of this nature with more uncertainty and under so many difficulties; for they had neither guides nor anything else which was necessary’ (Burchett, pp. 603–4; Walker's letters to Burchett, Captains' Letters, W. vol. vii.). In the end of May the squadron returned to Nevis, where, a few weeks later, it was joined by Vice-admiral John Graydon [q. v.], with whom it went to Jamaica, and later on to Newfoundland and England.
From 1705 to 1707 Walker commanded the Cumberland, in which, in the summer of 1706, he took out a reinforcement to Sir John Leake [q. v.] in the Mediterranean, and had part in the relief of Barcelona. In December 1707 he was appointed to the Royal Oak; in January 1707–8 to the Ramillies, and in June, under a recent order in council (18 Jan.), to be captain resident at Plymouth, to superintend and hasten the work of the port, and to be commander-in-chief in the absence of a flag-officer. On 15 March 1710–11 he was promoted to be rear-admiral of the white; about the same time he was knighted; and on 3 April he was appointed commander-in-chief ‘of a secret expedition,’ with an order to wear the union flag at the main when clear of the Channel. The ‘expedition’ intended against Quebec, consisting of ten ships of the line, with several smaller vessels and some thirty transports, carrying upwards of five thousand soldiers, commanded by Brigadier-general John Hill [q. v.], sailed from Plymouth in the beginning of May, and arrived in New England on 24 June. The supplies and reinforcements which were expected to be waiting for it were not ready, and the fleet did not sail for the St. Lawrence till 30 July. As they entered the river it began to blow hard, and on 21 Aug. a dense fog and an easterly gale compelled them, on the advice of the pilots, to lie to for the night. By the next morning they had drifted on to the north shore, among rocks and islands, where eight transports were cast away with the loss of nearly nine hundred men, and the rest of the fleet was saved with the greatest difficulty.
The stormy weather continuing, the pilots, ‘who had been forced on board the men-of-war by the government of New England, all judged it impracticable to get up to Quebec with a fleet.’ The ships, too, were short of provisions; the design of the expedition had been ‘industriously hid’ from the admiralty till the last moment; ‘a certain person—probably the Earl of Oxford is meant—seemed to value himself very much that a design of this nature was kept a secret from the admiralty’ (Burchett, p. 778), and the ships were neither victualled nor fitted for what was then a very exceptional voyage. A council of war was of opinion that if they had been higher up the river when the gale came on, they must all have been lost; and that now, being left, by the loss of one of the victuallers, with only ten weeks' provisions on short allowance, nothing could be done but to return to England as soon as possible. They arrived at St. Helen's on 9 Oct., ‘and thus ended an expedition so chargeable to the nation and
