Europe.[1] For the maintenance of such a pacification general and perpetual treaties might be formed, limiting the number of troops. to be maintained. Further, 'the maintenance of such a pacification might be considerably facilitated by the establishment of a common court of judicature, for the decision of differences between the several nations, although such court were not to be armed with any coercive powers'. 'It is an observation of somebody's,' says Bentham, 'that no nation ought to yield any evident point of justice to another. This must mean, evident in the eyes of the nation that is to judge, evident in the eyes of the nation called upon to yield. What does this amount to? That no nation is to give up anything of what it looks upon as its rights—no nation is to make any concessions. Wherever there is any difference of opinion between the negotiators of two nations, war is to be the consequence. While there is no common tribunal, something might be said for this. Concession to notorious injustice invites fresh injustice. Establish a common tribunal, the necessity for war no longer follows from difference of opinion. Just or unjust, the decision of the arbiters will save the credit, the honour of the contending party.' Can the arrangement proposed, he asks, justly be called visionary, when it can be established regarding it, that it is to the interest of the parties concerned; that they are themselves sensible of that interest; and that the situation it would place them in is not a new one, but merely that from which they set out? Give up colonies; found no new ones: this will be to the interest both of the mother-country and of the colonies, and it will save the danger of war. Do not seek to encourage particular branches of trade by prohibiting rival manufactures, by taxing rival manufactures, or by means of bounties on the trade meant to be favoured. Do not enter into wars for compelling treaties
- ↑ See Propositions iii–v and xi–xii, Works, ii, p. 550.
