less equivocal treatment of this subject, Vattel[1] starts impeccably from the position that good faith consists not only in the observance of promises, but also in not deceiving on any occasions that put us under any obligation to speak the truth; he throws over those writers, 'especially divines', who have made of truth a kind of deity, to which for its own sake, and without regard to consequences, we owe an inviolable respect; and he commends and takes his stand with those philosophers of 'more accurate ideas and more profound penetration' who acknowledge that truth, as the soul of human society, is in general to be respected, being the very basis of confidence in the mutual intercourse of men, but who ground the respect due to it on its effects. The word 'lies', accordingly, is to be given only to the words of him who speaks contrary to his
- ↑ Bk. iii, ch. x.
five years after the De Iure Belli ac Pacis—reasons from experience to the conditional nature of the sanctity of international compacts. Such contracts are valid as long as their basis of danger or of advantage holds, inasmuch as no one enters into an engagement, or is bound to stand by his compacts, unless there be a hope of some good to result, or the fear of some evil: remove this basis, and the compact becomes void; and this has been abundantly shown by experience ('… quippe nemo contrahit, nec pactis stare tenetur, nisi spe alicuius boni, vel sollicitudine alicuius mali: quod fundamentum si tollatur pactum ex sese tollitur; quod etiam experientia satis superque docet'). For, although different States agree among themselves not to do injury to each other, they take all possible precautions to prevent such agreements from being broken by the stronger party, and they do not rely upon the words of the compact ('nec fidem dictis habent'), unless it is clearly to the interest of both parties to observe it ('nisi utriusque ad contrahendum finem et utilitatem satis perspectam habuerint'). Otherwise they would fear a breach of faith; nor would there be wrong done. For what man of sense, who takes account of the right of sovereign powers, would put his trust in the promises of him who has both the will and the power to do what he likes, and who recognizes no higher law than the safety and interest of his dominion? ('cui sui imperii salus et utilitas summa lex debet esse')—c. xvi.
